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For all of its flaws, the institution of labor arbitration has remained the
core mechanism for settling disagreements between employers and unions
over the interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements.'
In this time of increasing demand for means of alternative dispute resolution
outside of the judicial arena, 2 practitioners in the area of labor relations law
have already developed sophisticated techniques of arbitration, mediation,

* Manley 0. Hudson Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
A.B. 1969, St. Louis University; J.D. 1972, Cornell Law School. This article is based
on a paper presented to the Third Annual Multi-State Labor and Employment Law
Seminar in Dallas, Texas.
1. It has been estimated that ninety-five percent of collective bargaining
agreements contain arbitration clauses. See W. GOULD, A PRImR ON AMERIcAN
LABOR LAW 136 (2d ed. 1986).
2. See, e.g., E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. ScI-wARTz, OUTSIDE THE COURTS:
A SURvEY OF DivH;sION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES (1977); Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, 40 Arm. J. 3 (1985); Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives
andAchieving the Goals of Civil Justice:JurisdictionalPrinciplesfor Process Choice,
1984 Wis. L. Rnv. 893.
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med-arb, negotiation and numerous other processes of conflict settlement.3
Labor arbitration and these other skills have had a developed history which
4
predates the current wave of extra-judicial means of dispute resolution.
In view of the practical necessities of an on-going relationship, the representatives of companies and labor organizations concluded very early that
they could not rely on the courts to settle every grievance alleging a breach
of contract and still manage to resolve their daily disputes without a serious
disruption of production needs and industrial harmony. The delay and cost
of using the judicial system would simply exact too heavy a price. Moreover,
in most instances the parties would have no need of the intricate procedural
devices for fact finding associated with the litigation process or, if necessary,
they could tailor their own fact-producing investigative procedures. Labor
and management practitioners also realized that they could better rely on a
group of expert adjudicators who would be acceptable to both parties and
who would be knowledgeable in the ways of the shop to determine those
disputes which the parties themselves could not resolve. In other words, the
parties could develop their own system of industrial justice and make it more
adaptable to the needs of their special relationship. It is a tribute to the
ingenuity of labor-management representatives that the techniques which they
developed and refined have served as a model to others in the burgeoning
field of alternative dispute resolution.'
In this time of growing emphasis on the use of private means to solve
socio-economic differences between parties in such a wide spectrum of legal
fields, it is almost paradoxical that perhaps never before has the labor arbitration system come under such intense judicial scrutiny. Courts have not
hesitated to ignore arbitral awards in areas dealing with issues such as employment discrimination, constitutional protections, or statutory rights. 6 FurSee J. DUNLOP, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS
(1984); 6 E. TEPLE & R. MOBERLY, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS
117-20 (1979); Summary Jury Trials Touted, 73 A.B.A. J. 27 (1987).
4. M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 315 (1968); F. ELKOURI &
3.

BUILDING

E.

ELKOURI,

How

ARBITRATION WoRxS

2-4 (4th ed. 1985); R. FLEMING,

THE LABOR

1-30 (1965); Nolan & Abrams, American Labor Arbitration:
The Early Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 373 (1983); Nolan & Abrams, American Labor
Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 557 (1983).
5. Smith, Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution: Practices and Possibilities in the Federal Government, 1984 Mo. J. OF Disp. REs. 9, 11.
6. See, e.g., Schneider Moving & Storage Co. v. Robbins, 466 U.S. 364
(1984) (Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980); McDonald v. City
of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (Section 1983 claim); Barrentine v. ArkansasBest Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985)
(Fair Labor Standards Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058 (1976) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Professional Adm'rs Ltd. v. Kopper-Glo Fuel, Inc., 819 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1987) (National
Labor Relations Act); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 752 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1102 (1985) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act);
EEOC v. County of Calumet, 686 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1982) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Marshall v. N.L. Indus., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980) (OccuARBITRATION PROCESS
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ther, courts have increasingly denied enforcement to the decisions of labor
arbitrators where judges have determined that arbitrators have employed
what courts considered "faulty judgment ' 7 or have made conclusions against
the grain of judicial "common sense." 8 In certain respects it is neither surprising nor improper that courts have expanded the reviewability of arbitral
decision-making. Indeed this phenomenon was predicted almost a decade ago
by Professor David Feller in his provocative and excellent exposition to the
National Academy of Arbitrators, "The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden
Age." 9 As the public law rights of employees, as individuals, have dramatically increased in the past twenty years, and as the issues in the workplace
have become more complicated due to developing technologies and a greater
awareness of the impact of change itself on the human value of labor, 0 the
decisions of labor arbitrators have likewise become more complex and far
reaching in impact." It is not surprising that neither the parties nor the labor
pational Safety and Health Act); Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals,
500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Kentucky Carbon Corp. v.
Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 420 U.S. 938 (1975) (Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act); Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp.
543 (D.N.J. 1987) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Kidder v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (Veteran's Reemployment Rights
Act); McMiller v. Bird & Son, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1086 (W.D. La. 1974) (Civil Rights
Act of 1866).
7. Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union De Tronquistas, 588 F. Supp. 679, 685
(D.P.R. 1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985); see infra text accompanying notes
42-50.
8. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 540 v. Great Western Food Co., 712
F.2d 122, 125 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 717 F.2d 1399 (5th Cir. 1983); see infra text
accompanying notes 97-106.
9. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in Proc. of the
29th Ann. Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, ARBrrRATioN-1976, at 97.
10. Many local union officials have recognized this change wrought by advancing technology. Rather than resisting such change, these union leaders favor a
response of contract language which will give labor organizations an influence over
the nature and impact of technology. Weikle & Wheeler, Unions and Technological
Change: Attitudes of Local Union Leaders, in Proc. of the 36th Ann. Meeting,
Industrial Relations Research Ass'n Series - 1983, at 100, 104. Such contract provisions would undoubtedly come within the jurisdiction of the grievance-arbitration
provisions of the collective agreement.
11. See, e.g., Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 937 (1983)
(McDermott, Arb.) (elimination of jobs in steel plant due to introduction of new
roll-setting equipment); Dravo Corp., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 427 (1982) (Sherman,
Arb.) (effect of time keeping computerization on job of time keepers); Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 372 (1981) (Seward, Arb.) (consolidation of positions
after introduction of new equipment allows one employee to monitor operations at
two pumping stations); Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 750 (1980)
(Garrett, Arb.) (effect on bargaining unit jobs of introduction of new self-contained
electronic switching system); CBS, Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1209 (1980) (Turkus,
Arb.) (increased use of portable television cameras results in layoffs of camerapersons); Bon Secours Hosp., Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 751 (1979) (Matthews, Arb.)
(assignment of social coding work to non-unit employees following installation of
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arbitrator can expect the validity and finality of an arbitrator's decision to
be determined simply by placing the arbitration award against the yardstick
of the collective bargaining agreement to see if it somehow measures the
"essence" of the company-union contract.' 2 If ever there was a time when
an arbitrator could render a decision on a matter without consideration of
3
close judicial oversight, it has now passed.'
This is not to say that the labor arbitration system has become simply
a lower tribunal subject to the full appellate process of review by the courts.
Notions of judicial economy and deference to the expressed, contractual
intent of the parties alone would dictate against such a result. It is still true
that the overwhelming majority of labor arbitration awards are upheld with
only cursory inspection by courts under the standards of Enterprise Wheel.' 4
new coding system that increased the efficiency of the operation); Leavenworth Times,
71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 396 (1978) (Bothwell, Arb.) (effect on bargaining unit employees
of newspaper employer's conversion from hot metal process to cold metal process).
12. The Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960), initiated the "essence of the contract" standard.
See infra text accompanying notes 16-21.
13. One commentator has persuasively argued that the Supreme Court abandoned any meaningful discussion of the standard of judicial review after its decision
in Enterprise Wheel. He has noted:
In the absence of adequate guidance, the lower courts have had difficulty
in formulating and applying standards to determine whether an arbitrator
has respected the limits of the authority granted him by the collective bargaining agreement. Similarly, courts have used inconsistent standards in
defining those instances when an arbitrator's decision, even though made
under proper authority, should not be considered for all purposes final. The
Supreme Court's reluctance to return to the subject in the face of demonstrated need has contributed to the wavering and uncertain path of judicial
review of arbitration awards.
Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80
CoLuM. L. REv. 267, 267-68 (1980). Accordingly, Professor Kaden contends that
courts, to a great extent, have always scrutinized arbitral awards more than they
should. Id. at 297-98.
14. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593; Textile Processors Employees Int'l Union
Local 108 v. Morgan Systems, Inc., 794 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1986); New Meiji Market
v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 905, 789 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986);
Local 863 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Jersey Coast Egg Producers, Inc., 773 F.2d 530
(3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1468 (1986); Chicago Web Printing Pressmen's
Union, No. 7 v. Chicago Newspaper Publishers' Ass'n, 772 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1985);
Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 768 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1184 (1986); Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gainesville, 729 F.2d 1046
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 346 (1985); TTL Distrib., Inc. v. Local 99,
Office Employees Union, 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983); see, e.g., Local 59, Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. Green Corp., 725 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833
(1984); Taunton Mun. Light Plant Comm. v. Paul L. Geiringer & Assocs., 725 F.2d
664 (1st Cir. 1983); Office &Professional Employees Int'l Union Local 2 v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 724 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Ottley v. Sheepshead Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1982); McClatchy Newspapers v. Central Valley
Typographical Union No. 46, 686 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,459 U.S. 1071 (1982);
GSX Corp. of Missouri v. Teamsters Local 610, 658 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Mo. 1987);
Teamsters Local 957 v. R.W.F. Distributing Co., 574 F. Supp. 703 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/1
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However, in an increasing number of cases, particularly those involving issues
of external law or public policy, the bases for attacking the finality of labor
arbitrators' decisions have become broader and the judicial scrutiny more
intense." Nor is it likely that this state of affairs will soon abate. The issues
of public policy and individual legal rights are becoming ever more intertwined with the employment relationship as expressed in collective bargaining
agreements. A corresponding augmentation of judicial review is inevitable.
Although this is not the age of inquisition as to the examination of arbitral
awards, it might be characterized as the age of judicial inquiry.
This Article first will trace and consider developments in the Enterprise
Wheel standard as applied to basic contractual disputes. Next the focus will
be on the cases that have applied emerging rules of review to arbitral decisions

F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Teamsters Local 957 v. R.W.F. Distributing Co., 574
F. Supp. 703 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 56-200; Professional Adm'rs Ltd. v.
Kopper-Glo Fuel, Inc., 819 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1987); S.D. Warren Co. v. United
Paperworkers Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987); Dobbs, Inc. v. Teamsters
Local 614, 813 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1987); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Electrical & Space
Technicians Local 1553, 809 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1987); Trailways Lines, Inc. v. Joint
Trailways Council, 807 F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 817 F.2d 1333 (8th
Cir. 1987) (en banc); Pinkerton's N.Y. Racing Sec. Serv., Inc. v. Local 32E, Service
Employees Int'l Union, 805 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1986); Newark Morning Ledger Co.
v. Newark Typographical Union Local 103, 797 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1986); United Auto
Workers v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 793 F.2d 810 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 403 (1986); Cement Divs., Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, Local 135
793 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1986); Avis Rent-A-Car Sys. v. Garage Employees Union Local
272, 791 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1986); United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local
1119 v. United Markets, Inc., 784 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1986); Champion Int'l Corp.
v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 779 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1985); Misco, Inc. v.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107
S. Ct. 871 (1987); Johnston Boiler Co. v. Local Lodge No. 983, Int'l Bhd. of Boiler
Makers, 753 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1985); HMC Management Corp. 759 F.2d 489 (1985)
(en banc); Bakers Union Factory No. 326 v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 749 F.2d
350 (6th Cir. 1984); Carpenters Local 1478 v. Stevens, 743 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985); United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal
Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984); Amalgamated Meatcutters Local 540
v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983); Broadway Cab Coop. v.
Teamsters Local 281, 710 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1983); Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated
Meatcutters v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1982); Perma-Line Corp.
v. Sign Pictoral & Display Union Local 230, 639 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1981); District
No. 72, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Teter Tool &Die, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 732 (N.D.
Ind. 1986); PECA v. A.A. Electric, 583 F. Supp. 472 (D. Haw. 1984); International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 323 v. Coral Elec. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D. Fla.
1983); Wilmington Typographical Union No. 123 v. News-Journal Co., 513 F. Supp.
987 (D. Del. 1981); Pacific Crown Distribs. v. Teamsters Local 70, 183 Cal. App.
3d 1138, 228 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1986); Port Huron Area School Dist. v. Port Huron
Educ. Ass'n, 426 Mich. 143, 393 N.W.2d 811 (1986); see also Survival of Labor Arbitrators, 125 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) News and Background Information 100, 101 (1987).
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implicating public law rights. Finally the Article will evaluate Enterprise
Wheel in relation to cases involving the volatile and expanding employment
at will doctrine.
I.

THE "EssENCE"

STANDARD

Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many
sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest
an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforce6
ment of the award.'
This basic guideline for review set down by Justice Douglas in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,17 has been an antinomy which
has continued to intrigue and confound judges, practitioners and scholars.
The rubric is well known and oft-cited from the Steelworkers Trilogy.'8 When
an arbitration clause encompasses a dispute, it is the decision of the arbitrator, not that of a court, for which management and labor have bargained.19
The parties have expressed an intent to use the labor arbitrator's special
expertise to effectuate a resolution of the disagreement. In Enterprise Wheel
the Court recognized that an arbitrator may look to "many sources" in
reaching a conclusion." Moreover a reviewing court should not weigh the
merits of the dispute or overrule an arbitrator simply because the judicial
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement differs from that of the
labor arbiter. This preference for the parties' own dispute resolution mechanism has been underscored in repeated judicial opinions and by congres2
sional mandate. '
Of course, the paradox has always been that the "essence" of the contract which is in dispute invariably is unclear - oftentimes intentionally so.
16.

United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597

(1960).
17. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593.
18. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Enterprise Wheel,
363 U.S. 593; see also AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S.
643 (1986).
19. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982): "Final adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." See also Nolde Bros. v. Local 358, Bakery Workers,
430 U.S. 243 (1977); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Laborers' Int'l Union of North America Local 309 v. W.W. Bennett Constr. Co., 686
F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1982); Johns-Mansville Sales Corp. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, Local Lodge 1609, 621 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/1
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Thus in deciphering an answer to a grievance, as to the meaning of the
parties' labor agreement, the arbitrator often concludes what the contract
would be, could be, or should be in a myriad of factual circumstances. This,
however, is the slipknot, since to a degree such a decision will require the
22
arbitrator to bring to bear his own notions or "brand of industrial justice."
When this occurs, the opportunity presents itself for a reviewing court to
declare that, rather than following the "essence" of the contract, the arbitrator has inappropriately applied the wrong "brand of industrial justice,"
i.e., the arbiter's own conclusions of what the contract was intended to
mean.Y
This vagueness, and to an extent contradiction, is at the same time the
strength as well as the vulnerability of the Enterprise Wheel standard. On
the one hand the court is encouraged to take a laissez faire approach and,
in the words of one commentator, allow the arbitrator to be the official
"contract reader."24 On the other hand, the decision presents a means whereby
a court can utilize its own brand of industrial equity by permitting a judge
to determine that an arbitrator has skewed the meaning of a contract in a
way never expected by the company or the union or to consider the decision
as an outrage to judicial propriety.
Certainly there are exceptions to the doctrine of finality of labor arbitration awards that are well defined and accepted: (1) where there are pro2
cedural irregularities, or there is bias or improper conduct by the arbitrator;
(2) where the arbitrator goes beyond the specific limitations placed by the
parties on the arbiter's jurisdiction; 26 (3) where an arbitrator commits a mis22. See Jones, "His own Brand of IndustrialJustice". The Stalking Horse
of JudicialReview of Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REv. 881, 884-85 (1983):
The court [in the Steelworkers Trilogy] seemed to recoil from the implications of its construct of arbitral independence in creating the "essence" test,
a paradox in that it conceptually joins issues which are functionally incompatible. The Court said that judges must not allow arbitrators to stray
beyond the parameters of the essence of collective agreements. But it also
said that the parties' chosen arbitrators are more aware than are judges of
the parties' intents and needs that constitute that "essence." Thus, as written, the "essence" test is simply unworkable.
Id.
23. See Jones, supra note 22.
24. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1137, 1138 (1977).
25. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1982); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York Dist. Council
Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984); Totem Marine Tug & Barge,
Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1979); International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Coral Elec. Corp., 104 F.R.D. 88 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Teamsters Local 506 v. E.D. Clapp Corp., 551 F. Supp. 570 (N.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 742
F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1983).
26. Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.
1982); Buzz Oates Enters. v. Sacramento Area Carpenters, 534 F. Supp. 481 (N.D.
Cal. 1982); Western Elec. Co. v. Communications Workers, 450 F. Supp. 876, 881
(E.D.N.Y.) aff'd, 591 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1978).
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take as to specific contract language or as to facts central to a decision 27 or
(4) where a violation of the duty of fair representation by a union taints an
award rendered by a labor arbitrator.H However, as courts begin to expand
beyond these exceptions into areas of more second - "essence" - guessing,
the danger likewise increases of giving more encouragement to the disgruntled
party, i.e., the loser, to remove the decision-making process from the arbitral
forum into the litigation arena. The troublesome area in this regard has been
with those cases which rely too heavily on what a court considers to be
beyond the anticipation of the parties or what one might refer to as the
"expectability" doctrine. The problem is as old as the 1966 case of Torrington Company v. Metal Products Workers Union Local 1645.29 There the
arbitrator could find no written contractual provisions regarding the disputed
issue of whether the employer was required to permit employees paid time
off to vote on election days. The arbitrator held for the union and based
his decision on a twenty-year past practice which the employer had unilaterally discontinued. The court concluded that an arbitrator's authority is "an
appropriate question for judicial review." 30 The court held that "the arbitrator's decision that he has authority should not be accepted where the
reviewing court can clearly perceive that he has derived that authority from
sources outside the collective bargaining agreement at issue."'" This decision
was roundly criticized as improper under Enterprise Wheel, and as an example of a court simply disagreeing with an arbitrator's judgment rather
than a determination that the arbitrator had exceeded his contractual authority. 32 After all, if an arbitrator cannot look to individual or industry
27. St. Louis Theatrical Co. v. St. Louis Theatrical Bhd. Local 6, 715 F.2d
405 (8th Cir. 1983); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 1139 v. Litton
Sys., 704 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1983); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of
Georgia Ry. Co., 415 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Automotive Union Local 618, 570 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mo.

1983); Ziegler Coal Co. v. District 12, United Mine Workers, 484 F. Supp. 445 (C.D.
Ill. 1980).
28. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); see 2 C.
MoRs, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1328-37 (2d ed. 1983); see also Vaca v. Sipes,

386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), reh'g denied, 376
U.S. 935 (1964).

29. 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966). For another early case similarly limiting an
arbitrator's authority, see Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d
894 (4th Cir. 1961) (arbitrator exceeded his authority by distinguishing between greater
and lesser penalties in determining that employee's misconduct warranted discipline
but not discharge).
30. Torrington, 362 F.2d at 680.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Aaron, JudicialIntervention in Labor Arbitration,20 STAN. L.
REv. 41 (1967); Jones, The Name of the Game is Decision - Some Reflections on
"Arbitrability" and "Authority" in LaborArbitration, 46 TEX. L. REv. 865 (1968);
Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. Cm. L.
REv. 545 (1967).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/1
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custom as a legitimate source in determining the parties' expectations to an
33
issue in fashioning an award, where can one go?
However, Torrington cannot be dismissed simply as an outdated judicial
aberration. A more recent converse is Clinchfield Coal Company v. District
28, United Mine Workers.34 There the company and union had an agreement
as follows:
Licensing out of coal mining operations on coal lands owned or held under
lease or sublease by any signatory party hereto shall not be permitted unless
the licensing out does not cause or result in the layoff of Employees of the
3
Employer. 1
It was undisputed that the company had licensed certain coal mines to many
independent contractors for a number of years. When the employer shut
down one of its own mines, the union grieved and the arbitrator found that
the licensing had caused layoffs in violation of the collective bargaining
provision. The Fourth Circuit overturned the arbitrator's award as not drawing its essence from the contract and thus going beyond the parties' expectations. The court concluded that economic conditions had caused the mine
closing and not the prior licensing of other coal mining operations. 6 The
appellate court affirmed the conclusion of the district court that by ignoring
the economic evidence of the company and three prior arbitral awards in the
industry to the contrary (each involving different companies and different
locals, although the same contractual language), the arbitrator "disregarded
the 'common law of the . .. industry' which 'is an integral part of the
37
contract,' and thereby strayed from the essence of the Agreement."
Thus, contrary to the Torringtonsituation where the arbitrator had relied
solely on past practice without specific contractual support, the arbitrator's
33. Many authorities are of the opinion that past practice and customs can
be as binding as the written provisions of a labor contract. As one commentator has
noted:
Past practice may serve to clarify, implement, and even amend contract
language. But these are not its only functions. Sometimes an established
practice is regarded as a distinct and binding condition of employment, one
which cannot be changed without the mutual consent of the parties. Its
binding quality may arise either from a contract provision which specifically
requires the continuance of existing practices or, absent such a provision,
from the theory that long-standing practices which have been accepted by
the parties become an integral part of the agreement with just as much force
as any of its written provisions.
Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 1017, 1030 (1961); see also CNPA v. Pressmen's Union
No. 7, 821 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1987); F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURi, supra note 4, at
437-56; C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 301-03 (3d ed. 1970).
34. 720 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1983).
35. Id. at 1367.
36. Id. at 1369-70.
37. Id. at 1369 (citation omitted).
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failure in Clinchfield to look at industrial practice and confining himself to
the interpretation of the language of the contract was an improper "brand
of industrial justice." Indeed the court was so convinced as to the incorrectness of the arbitrator's conclusion that a year later it reversed a second
arbitral decision, which was to the same effect as the first award and which
involved the same parties but concerned the shutdown of a different mine.38
But to whom had the parties entrusted that determination of the meaning
of the contract language and the effect to be given to industrial practice? If
the Supreme Court decision in W. R. Grace & Co. 39 teaches anything, it40
should be that one arbitrator is not bound by the decision of another.
Moreover, after the last award, the industry custom was seemingly at a 3-2
posture since, although at least three arbitrators took the companies' position, 4' two have now upheld the union's view. One can question just how
common the law of that industry or operation is. In Clinchfield, like Torrington, the reviewing court primarily disagreed with the type of arbitral
interpretation which, while perhaps debatable, was grounded in contractual
essence. Once again the court seems to be defeating the purpose of the
Enterprise Wheel standard while purporting to follow it.
Another area of increasing judicial intervention is where the "rogue
arbitrator" strikes. This occurs when the losing party can convince a judge
that no one with common sense could have reached such a conclusion as
that made by a particular arbitrator and that such an unanticipated result
38. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. District 28, United Mine Workers, 736 F.2d 998
(4th Cir. 1984). The court again relied on the 'common law' of the industry as
expressed in past arbitral decisions" that layoffs due to economic conditions were
exempt from leasing out contract provisions. Id. at 999. Thus when the arbitrator
made a finding that the contract had been violated, even though the decision to close
the mine was due to economic losses, the court felt the decision clearly did not draw
its essence from the contract. Id.
39. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber
Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983); see infra text accompanying notes 76-82.
40. This view that one arbitrator's decision is not binding in the sense of
concepts of stare decisis is the prevailing view among arbitrators and authorities in
the field. Consolidation Coal Co., 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1037 (1985) (Duda, Arb.);
Associated Grocers of Alabama, Inc., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 261 (1984) (Odom, Arb.);
Arch of Illinois, Inc., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 625 (1984) (Hewitt, Arb.); Hospital Linen
Serv. Facility, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 549 (1983) (Talarico, Arb.); North Am. Rayon
Corp., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 880 (1982) (Whyte, ARb.); Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 905 (1979) (Carson, Arb.); Detroit Edison Co.,
73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 565 (1979) (Lipson, Arb.); Dresser Indus., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
138 (1979) (Layborn, Arb.); see also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOuriu, supra note 4, at 41436; 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 570-79 (2d
ed. 1983).
41. In Clinchfield I, the court pointed to three arbitration decisions supporting
the notion that layoffs for economic reasons might not run afoul of the leasing
prohibition. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. District 28, United Mine Workers, 720 F.2d
1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1983).
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should be given no legal effect. A good example is Hoteles Condado Beach
v. Union De Tronquistas.42 There the company discharged an employee, a
male lifeguard, for allegedly engaging in immoral conduct in front of a female
guest. At the hearing the arbitrator granted the union's request to exclude
the husband of the female guest from the hearing room while she testified.
The wife then refused to give testimony. At that point the company submitted
a judgment and transcript in a criminal case concerning the same incident.
The arbitrator conditionally accepted the transcript at the hearing but later
ruled in his decision that he had decided not to consider it, since it gave him
no opportunity to view the credibility or demeanor of the witness.4 3 The
arbitrator sustained the grievance and overturned the discharge.
The federal district court concluded that the arbitrator's decision was
beyond the mutual expectations of the parties and was fundamentally unfair.
According to the court the employee violated a disciplinary rule which required his discharge for immoral conduct. In so ruling the district judge
noted:
The arbitrator's rationale is challenged here because the conduct of the
employee is a per se violation of his employment contract without need of
any identification of rules or regulations. The subsequent reversal of the
discharged employee's [criminal] conviction would not have had any effect
on the arbitration hearing. The burden of proof required at the arbitration
hearing is the preponderance of evidence standard, as opposed to the higher
burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding. 4
In regard to the fundamental unfairness of the proceeding, the court stated
that, although arbitration is concededly a private affair, the exclusion of the
husband from the hearing room was "short-sighted and misconceived. ' 4 1
The court then held that it was error for the arbitrator to fail to give weight
to the transcript, since the company had relied on it as its sole evidence and
such a sworn document would be admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence
803 and 804.46 The court considered the exclusion of the transcript to be
"faulty judgment" by the arbitrator. 47
While one might question the merits of the decision of the arbitrator in
this case, the finding of the district court is even more disturbing in regard
to its effect on the doctrine of the finality of labor arbitration awards. There
is a fair degree of arbitral authority for the proposition that employee discharges for offenses involving moral turpitude should require clear and con42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

588 F. Supp. 679 (D.P.R. 1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985).
Id. at 682, 684-85.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 684.
FED. R. Evm. 803(8), 804(b)(1).
588 F. Supp. at 685.
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vincing evidence or even evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 48 Moreover,
it is hard to find that the parties had never contemplated the possibility of
a penalty less than discharge for an offense involving immoral conduct when
the company's disciplinary rules for just such an infraction specifically stated
the penalties as follows: "first offense - suspension or dismissal; second
offense - dismissal." ' 49 Finally requiring arbitrators to apply the federal rules
of evidence or judicial notions as to sequestration of witnesses is imposing
a burden of formality and procedure that parties attempt to avoid by agreeing
to an arbitration clause. 50 Certainly the court and not the arbitrator decided
this case on its notions of the parties' expectations of contractual justice.

Cases like Clinchfield Coal Co. and Hoteles Condado Beach, while not
the rule, are by no means unique examples.5 1 As exceptions to the doctrine
48. Many arbitrators subscribe to the theory outlined by arbitrator Adolph
Koven in Atlas Freight Lines, 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 352 (1962), a case involving the
discharge of an employee for theft:
But in cases involving moral turpitude and where the charges are in their
nature criminal, a much higher degree of proof is required. Since the instant

case involves a charge of theft and thus involves moral turpitude with the
loss of job, loss of seniority and other contractual rights, and possible loss
of reputation at stake, in accordance with overwhelming authority, the degree of proof required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 358 (citations omitted); see also Regional Transp. Dist., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1225, 1234 (1983) (Eaton, Arb.) (clear and convincing evidence); Progressive Transp.,
80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 546, 547 (1983) (Wilmoth, Arb.) (beyond a reasonable doubt);
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 409, 412 (1980) (Seibel, Arb.) (clear
and convincing evidence); Hughes Air Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 148, 156 (1979)
(Barsamian, Arb.) (clear and convincing evidence); Eastern Assoc. Coal Co., 66 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1063, 1064 (1976) (Lubow, Arb.) (evidence beyond a reasonable doubt);
Dockside Mach. & Boilerworks, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1221, 1226 (1970) (Block,
Arb.) (beyond a reasonable doubt); F. ELKoui & E. ELKOURi, supra note 4, at 66163; M. HILL, JR. & A. SINICROPI, EViDENCE IN ARBITRATION 10-13 (1980); Aaron,
Some ProceduralProblems in Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. REV. 733, 740-42 (1957).
49. 588 F. Supp. at 686. The court found that the arbitrator made an incorrect assumption that these disciplinary rules concerning immoral conduct applied
only to casino employees rather than all employees of the hotel. Id. However, even
if the arbitrator had applied these rules, which were a part of the collective bargaining
agreement, a possible penalty for the violation was suspension rather than discharge.
50. American Postal Workers v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 6
(D.C. Cir. 1986); Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc. v. Liang, 653 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir.
1981); Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R., 516 F. Supp.
1305, 1315 (D.D.C. 1981); F. ELKOuRI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 4, at 296-98; M.
SCHEINMAN, EVIDENCE & PROOF IN ARBITRATION 15 (1977).
51. Dobbs, Inc. v. Local No. 614, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 813 F.2d 85 (6th
Cir. 1987) (arbitrator failed to properly recognize and confirm employer's right to
discipline and enforce working rules in reinstating employee who had been discharged
for habitual tardiness); Trailways Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 807
F.2d 1416 (8th Cir. 1986) (arbitrator acted improperly in overturning bus company's
"no-beards" policy for garage employees when he copied a substantial portion of
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of finality of arbitral awards expand, particularly in the area of cases involving public policy, 52 a corresponding increase in the number of cases has
occurred where courts simply seemed concerned with the discretionary authority of arbitrators in contractual interpretation situations. If a judge does
not like the "brand of justice," he can simply find a lack of "essence" on
the basis of the expectability doctrine. The flaw in this approach is that what
the parties have anticipated in negotiations, and indeed have agreed upon in
a collective bargaining contract, is that the labor arbitrator rather than a
court will determine their expectations as to the numerous unforeseen situations and disputes which arise, when such are not clear from the language
of the agreement.53 Even more fundamentally, such an approach falls to
his analysis from one of his prior, completely different cases and did not give effect
to the intent of the parties as evidenced in the contract); Clinchfield Coal Co. v.
District 28, United Mine Workers, 736 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1984) (failure to give effect
to past practice regarding licensing of independent contractors); Clinchfield Coal Co.
v. District 28, United Mine Workers, 720 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1983) (again failure to
give effect to past practice in regard to licensing of independent contractors of coal
mines); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers Local 1139 v. Litton Sys., 704
F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1983) (failure to give effect to mandatory contractual requirement
concerning inventory and vacation during plant shutdown); Pacific Motor Trucking
Co. v. Automotive Machinists Union, 702 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1983) (employer demotion of long-standing employee upheld despite arbitrator's decision); Devine v.
White, 697 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (judicial review by director of personnel of
arbitration awards); Lackawanna Leather Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Dist. Union No. 271, 692 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1982) (overturning arbitrator's decision
regarding the discharge of an employee after three written notices involving different
infractions, but all for poor performance within one year), vacated, 706 F.2d 228
(8th Cir. 1983); Hoteles Condado Beach v. Union De Tronquistas, 588 F. Supp. 679
(D.P.R. 1984), aff'd, 763 F.2d 34 (lst Cir. 1985) (reinstatement of employee discharged for engaging in sexual misconduct overturned); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Automotive Union Local No. 618, 570 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (overturning
arbitration board decision reinstating employee who had continued rude and discourteous service despite agreement to the contrary); Buzz Oates Enters. v. Sacramento Area Dist. Council of Carpenters, 534 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (overturning
arbitrator's award deciding factual questions without holding hearings or without
deciding legal questions as parties had agreed); Aeronautical Machinists Lodge 709
v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 521 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (arbitrator failed to
consider contractual provision concerning right of union business representative to
access company premises), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983); Port Huron Area
School Dist. v. Port Huron Educ. Ass'n, 426 Mich. 143, 393 N.W.2d 811 (1986)
(arbitrator, on his own initiative, improperly interpreted the preamble of the collective
bargaining agreement as prohibiting the use of sex as a qualification in determining
lay-off rights).
52. See cases cited supra note 15.
53. As the Supreme Court noted in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960):
Arbitration is the means of solving the unforseeable by molding a system
of private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their
solution in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and
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recognize that arbitration is not just a substitute for litigation but is the
alternative means for companies and unions to resolve their disputes without
applying economic weapons.5 4 As such, the arbitration process is its own
system of collective governance. 5 5 The more often courts encroach on the
finality of awards through use of the expectability doctrine in applying the
Enterprise Wheel "essence" standard, the more the system itself deteriorates
as parties simply look at an arbitrator's decision as one more step in the
litigation process.
II.

EXTERNAL LAW:

EnterprisePlus

The debate among arbitrators and others has been ongoing as to whether
and to what extent a labor arbitrator should apply external law when rendesires of the parties. The processing of disputes through the grievance
machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to
the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 581. See also Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HAuv. L. REV. 999 (1955).
54. This point that "the agreement to arbitrate grievances disputes is the quid
pro quo for an agreement not to strike" has been the underpinning of the arbitral
system since Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). See
also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
The Supreme Court has linked these two concepts to the extent that, if the parties
include a comprehensive arbitration clause in their collective agreement, the courts
will imply a no-strike obligation. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers, 414 U.S.
368 (1974); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The effect
of the arbitral system then is quite different than litigation. It is to resolve the parties'
differences by methods which will avoid industrial disruption but still maintain the
tenets of the underlying, continuing relationship in a manner compatible with their
written agreement. Abrams, The Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 76 MIcH. L. REv.
231, 232 (1977); Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE
L.J. 525, 533-34 (1969); see generally Meltzer, supra note 32.
55. This point was aptly stated by Professor Feller:
The collective bargaining agreement is not a contract insofar as it establishes
the rights of employers and employees, but is, rather, a set of rules governing
their relationship. Rules that are integral with and cannot be separated from
the machinery that the parties have established to resolve disputes as to their
meaning. Consider, for example, the provision in the automobile agreements
setting forth the principles governing the setting of production standards.
That provision is substantively different, and intended to be so, from a
provision in the same agreement governing seniority or specifying that discharge shall be only for just cause. The difference is that disputes as to the
latter provisions are subject to arbitration, while the disputes as to the former
are intended to be solved only by the use, or non-use, of the strike. But in
neither case are the rules intended to be seen as contractual, that is, adjudicable by the courts.
Feller, supra note 9, at 101 (emphasis in original); see also United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective
BargainingAgreements, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1958); Cox, Rights Under a LaborAgreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1956); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor
Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999 (1955).
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dering a decision under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The
positions of different scholars have spanned the spectrum of opinions. Some
have argued, with great persuasiveness, that the designated role of the labor
arbitrator is only to interpret what the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement mean without regard to external law.5 6 In this analysis courts are
only to decide whether the contractual provision, as interpreted by the arbitrator, violates statutes or public policy. The contrary position, advanced
by other scholars with equally convincing arguments, is that arbitrators must
always consider external law, since parties to a collective bargaining agreement either expressly or impliedly obligate themselves to conform to public
law.5 7 This Article will not consider this thorny issue. Rather, the premise
here is that in many instances arbitrators do utilize considerations of external
law when reaching decisions on the meaning and interpretation of a labor
contract and that the decisions of labor arbitrators often affect public law
rights.58 The issue then becomes how courts should review such awards.
This situation has become increasingly more common as Congress and
state legislatures have passed a plethora of statutes extending various rights
to individual employees. Thus the National Labor Relations Act,5 9 the Fair
Labor Standards Act,6 the Equal Pay Act,6 ' Title VII of the Civil Rights
56. Meltzer, supra note 32; Meltzer, The Role of Law in Arbitration: Rejoinders, in Proc. of the 21st Ann. Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, at 58
(1968); St. Antonine, supra note 24.
57. Howlett, The Arbitrator, The NLRB, and The Courts, in Proc. of the
20th Ann. Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, at 67, 83 (1967); see also Feller,
supra note 9; Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1969); Platt, The Relations Between Arbitration and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REv. 398 (1969); Sovern, When
Should ArbitratorsFollow FederalLaw?, in Proc. of the 23rd Ann. Meeting, Nat'l
Academy of Arbitrators, at 29 (1970).
58. See, e.g., Lucky Stores, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 841 (1987) (Gentile, Arb.)
(religious discrimination); Alabama By-Products Corp., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1320
(1982) (Clarke, Arb.) (religious discrimination under Title VII); United Technologies
Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 92 (1982) (Bloch, Arb.) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973);
Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1171 (1982) (Koven, Arb.) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Social Security Administration, 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 449
(1982) (Mittelman, Arb.) (religious discrimination under Title VII); Flint Bd. of Educ.,
77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 244 (1981) (Daniel, Arb.) (requirements of affirmative action
program); Mare Island Naval Shipyard, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 462 (1981) (Aller, Arb.)
(Occupational Safety and Health Act); Reynolds Metal Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1121 (1980) (Welch, Arb.) (Age Discrimination and Employment Act); Hurley Hospital, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1013 (1978) (Roumell, Arb.) (religious discrimination);

National Broadcasting Co., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 762 (1978) (Gentile, Arb.) (racial
discrimination).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
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Act of 1964,62 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 63 the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 64 the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 65
and other federal laws directly affect the employment relationship and can
impact significantly on collective rights under a labor contract. The accommodation of such individual statutory rights with obligations and duties under
a collective agreement has caused notable tension. Moreover, collective bargaining interests and arbitral decisions often involve public policy rights which,
while not aimed directly at employment, can involve management decisions
regarding employees. For instance, a decision to discharge an employee who
has reported illegal activity by an employer or other employees to a state
authority may fall within the parameters of a company's right to discharge
for just cause under a labor agreement, and yet be contrary to the policy of
a state statute encouraging the communication of such information by any
persons. 66
In these instances where external law interacts with collective bargaining
agreements, courts' review of arbitral decisions has not been limited simply
to applying the "essence" standard to see if there is a link between the award
of the labor arbitrator and the terms or meaning of the contract. Since the
labor agreement may not even address the public law rights, or indeed may
run counter to them, courts are applying a more exacting standard of review,
which will be referred to in this Article as EnterprisePlus.
The roots of this more encompassing principle of review of arbitral cases
involving public law issues can be traced back to Enterprise Wheel itself. In
that opinion Justice Douglas noted that an arbitrator could look to many
sources, including legal criteria, to determine a contractual dispute. 67 However, he concluded that if the arbitrator's decision was based "solely upon
the arbitrator's view of the requirement of the enactment of legislation," as
opposed to interpreting the collective agreement, then the arbitrator "exceeded the scope of the submission" and the award would not be enforced.
It should be a somewhat rare occurrence where an arbitrator would totally
disregard the plain terms of a labor contract and utilize only external law
guidelines. 69 However, the Court in Enterprise Wheel underscored that the
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
65. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
66. Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); see also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85
Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
67. Justice Douglas noted that in interpreting a contract an arbitrator could
"look for guidance from many sources," and more specifically might refer "to 'the
law' for help in determining the sense of the agreement." United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960).
68. Id. at 597.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
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primary focus of the arbitrator's attention was interpreting the parties' agreement rather than making pronouncements as to the meaning of statutory
rights.
The more limited basis of an arbitrator's authority in a contractual
dispute involving public law issues was crystallized in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Company.70 There the Court drew a sharp distinction between contractually based rights under a just cause discharge clause and statutory rights
under Title VII. 71 The Court again clearly stated that an arbitrator could not
make a decision contrary to the labor agreement simply on the basis of an
arbitral interpretation of statutory rights.72 Since the anti-discrimination obligations were based on public law independent of the labor contract, and
since the arbitral procedures in regard to the competence of arbitrators (especially non-attorneys) to handle public law considerations and the ability
of the arbitral process to develop facts without discovery, rules of evidence
or other judicial fact-finding measures were considered inferior, the Court
refused to give binding effect to an arbitrator's decision which included the
public law issue.73
70. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
71. The Court noted that there was no inconsistency between an employee
pursuing remedies under a collective bargaining agreement and Title VII:
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate
his contractual right under a collective bargaining agreement. By contrast,
in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory
rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated
as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency
results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.
Id. at 49-50.
72. The Court stated:
The arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke public laws that
conflict with the bargain between the parties.... If an arbitral decision is
based "solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted
legislation," rather than on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining
agreement, the arbitrator has "exceeded the scope of the submission," and
the award will not be enforced.
Id. at 53 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960)).
73. Id. at 56-60. Although some commentators felt that the decision in Alexanderv. Gardner-Denverwould result in the demise of the arbitration process because
employees would have alternate means of redress and employers might exclude arbitration clauses from labor agreements, such does not seem the case. See, e.g., Siber,
The Gardner-DenverDecision:Does It Put Arbitration in a Bind?, 25 LAB. L.J. 708
(1974). Rather, arbitration of employment discrimination claims seems often to lead
to a resolution of the underlying dispute. B. Scmrti & P. GnossmAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMNATION LAW 1083-87 (2d ed. 1983); Edwards, Arbitration of Employment
DiscriminationCases: A Proposalfor Employer and Union Representatives, 27 LAB.
L.J. 265 (1976).
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However, in a footnote the Court held that the judicial body which was
entrusted with determining the public law issue had deference-granting discretion where: (1) the legal issue was covered by the labor agreement, (2) the
question involving external lav was fully and fairly presented to the arbitrator, and (3) the arbitrator had the ability to handle and actually considered
the public law matter. 74 This same policy and rationale has been applied by
the Supreme Court subsequently in regard to other employment-related stat75
utes.
Any doubts as to whether a court reviewing an arbitral decision could
utilize the concept of public policy were dispelled by W.R. Grace and Company v. Local Union 759, International Union of Rubber Workers.76 The
employer in the case faced a lay-off situation and had decided to follow the
provisions of a conciliation agreement between it and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (which a district court had found to be binding)
rather than the terms of a seniority clause in its collective bargaining agreement with the union. As a result, more senior males were laid off instead
of junior female employees, and the male employees filed a number of grievances.77 In deciding one of the grievances which arose concerning the lay74. 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. There has been some confusion in the lower courts
in regard to the standards for deferral outlined in note 21. Some courts have accorded "great weight" to arbitral awards involving discrimination claims. Dripps v.
United Parcel Serv., 381 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 506 (3d Cir.
1985); see also Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1977). Other
courts have given little or no weight to an arbitral decision. For instance, in Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 519 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058
(1976), the court of appeals, on remand, affirmed the trial court's decision granting
judgment for the employer. The only mention made of the arbitration award was in
the factual rescitation that "[t]he arbitrator did not consider whether racial discrimination was involved in the discharge." 519 F.2d at 505; see also Corbin v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Kornbulh v. Sterns & Foster
Co., 73 F.R.D. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1976). The "devolution principle" discussed infra
would require a court to give the arbitrator's decision deference if certain clear
standards are met. See infra text accompanying notes 146-200.
75. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (42
U.S.C. § 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981)
(Fair Labor Standards Act); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
76. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
77. The company had agreed to conciliate with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), but the union had refused. In December of 1974,
the company and the EEOC signed a conciliation agreement that if layoffs occurred,
the company would keep a given percentage of female employees. The company had
previously filed suit to prevent the union from arbitrating any conflicting rights under
the collective bargaining agreement and for a judicial determination that the conciliation agreement would supersede the labor contract. In November of 1975, the federal
district court upheld the conciliation agreement. Both before and after this decision,
the company laid off male employees not by seniority, but according to the conciliation agreement. In January of 1978, the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision of the
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off, the arbitrator refused to follow the decision on the same issue by a prior
arbitrator which had upheld the conciliation agreement over the labor contract. 78 Rather the second arbitrator looked only to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement to find that the company violated the seniority provisions. 79 In reviewing the arbitral award, the Supreme Court applied not
only the Enterprise Wheel "essence" standard but also held that a collective
bargaining agreement, like any contract, could not be "contrary to public
policy." 80 The determination as to the applicability of public policy was for
a reviewing court to decide in making a ruling whether to enforce or to
vacate an arbitrator's award that allegedly violated statutory or constitutional
rights. The Court did not hold that such a standard of review was limitless.
Rather the Court concluded that the public policy had to be "explicit," "well
defined and dominant," and must be "ascertained by reference to the laws
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests."'" In the facts of the case, the Court found that the arbitrator's
award had not violated any such notions of public policy in his interpretation
of the labor contract; however, it left no uncertainty as to the use of public
82
policy as a gauge to determine the propriety of an arbiter's decision.
This explicit incorporation of a public policy standard by W.R. Grace
& Co. into the otherwise limited contractual review under Enterprise Wheel
has caused a good deal of disarray within the federal circuits in subsequent
cases.0 3 Despite the restrictive language in the W.R. Grace & Co. opinion,
federal district court and upheld the union's counterclaim to require arbitration of
the collective bargaining grievances. Although the company reinstated the laid off
male employees, these employees' grievances concerning back pay remained intact.
461 U.S. at 759-63.
78. The first grievance to reach arbitration concerning the back pay issue was
that of a male employee who had been demoted while the federal district court order
modifying the seniority provisions was in effect. In August of 1978, the arbitrator,
Anthony J. Sabella, denied the grievance on the ground that it would be inequitable
to penalize the company for conduct that complied with the order of the district
court. Another grievance involving three other employees, two laid off before and
one laid off after the entry of the district court order was brought before arbitrator
Gerald A. Barrett. Arbitrator Barrett refused to follow the award of arbitrator Sabella
and upheld the employees' grievance for back pay, since he determined there was a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and the labor contract contained no
defense of good faith for the company. 461 U.S. at 762-64.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 766.
81. Id. (citation omitted).
82. For a critical review of W.R. Grace, as court approval of one arbitrator,
in effect, voiding the decision of another arbitrator, see Christensen, W.R. Grace &
Co.: An Epilogue to the Trilogy?, in Proc. of the 37th Ann. Meeting, Nat'l Academy
of Arbitrators, ARBITRATION 1984: ABSENTEEISM, RECENT LAW, PANELS, AND PUBLISHED DECISIONS, at 21.
83. A number of courts have broadly interpreted a public policy exception to
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the concept of public policy based on external law presents a rather large
offensive opening for challenges to arbitral awards by disgruntled losers.
vacate awards of arbitrators. Professional Adm'rs Ltd. v. Kopper-Glo Fuel, Inc.,
819 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1987) (arbitration award permitting trustees of pension funds
to unilaterally increase contribution rates was contrary to public policy of the National
Labor Relations Act requiring collective bargaining over wages and benefits); S.D.
Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987) (arbitrator's reinstatement of employee discharged for using and distributing drugs on
company property violated public policy); Local One, Amalgamated Lithographers
v. Stearns & Beale, Inc., 812 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1987) (arbitration committee's decision
to bind a non-signatory employer that was not a "single employer" with a company
that was a party to a collective bargaining agreement was against public policy);
United Auto Workers v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 793 F.2d 810 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 403 (1986) (arbitrator's award vacated for failure to consider public
policy behind the enactment of ERISA requiring annual funding of pension agreement); Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 871 (1987) (reinstatement of employee apprehended on
company premises in a car containing marijuana smoke and in whose car marijuana
had been found was contrary to public policy against operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol); United States Postal
Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984) (reinstatement of employee who had been convicted of embezzling postal funds violates public
policy and is unenforceable); Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 540 v. Great Western
Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983) (vacating arbitrator's award reinstating employee who violated the public policy against truck drivers drinking and driving);
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983) (denial of enforcement of arbitrator's
award reinstating postal service employee who had participated in a strike against the
postal service in violation of law); Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1982) (arbitrator's award upholding company rule prohibiting employees from access to USDA meat inspectors violated public
policy).
On the other hand, a number of courts have given a more limited interpretation
to the public policy exception. E.g., United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (arbitration award reinstating letter
carrier who was discharged after arrest for unlawful delay of mail was no basis to
apply public policy exception to the finality of arbitral awards); Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987), petitionfor cert. filed,
March 26, 1987 (arbitration award reinstating pilot who had been discharged for
flying while under the influence of alcohol did not violate public policy for airline
safety); Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986) (arbitration
awards reinstating employees who had been terminated because they were undocumented aliens did not violate clearly defined public policy); E.I. DuPont & Co. v.
Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 186 (1986) (arbitrator's award reinstating worker who had assaulted fellow employee does not violate public policy of providing a safe working environment);
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (arbitrator's decision to reinstate employee who had not been given a Mirandatype warning before confessing to alleged dishonesty in handling postal transactions
was not against public policy).
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4
Such attacks on the validity of arbitral awards have definitely increased.1
In such cases the reviewing court must measure the award not only against
the norm of the collective agreement but also against notions of public law
- the EnterprisePlus standard.
There are basically three instances where external law and the Enterprise
Plus standard become involved in the arbitral process: (1) an arbitrator, sua
sponte, utilizes public law as a basis for an award; (2) the arbitrator renders
a decision on a contractual issue which one of the parties claims conflicts
with some legal rights; or (3) the parties, as part of their submission agreement, request the arbitrator to decide a contractual issue based on public
policy principles. Each of these situations will be considered separately.
In many cases, in order to resolve a contractual dispute, an arbitrator
will turn to legal guidelines based on statutes or judicial opinions to aid in
the decision-making process, even though the parties have not specifically
incorporated the public law as a part of their issue. For example, an arbitrator
may be presented with an issue as to whether the unilateral discontinuation
of a benefit by an employer violates the collective bargaining agreement
between the company and union. The employer may claim that such action
is permissible under a management rights clause and the union may contend
that the action violates the union recognition clause, a specific economic
provision in the contract, or past practice." The standard of review of the

84. See supra note 83; Survival of Labor Arbitrators, 125 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) News and Background Information 100 (1987).
85. See, e.g., Texas Utils. Generating Co., 85-1 Arb. (CCH) 8066 (1984)
(Heinsz, Arb.) (company improperly discontinued annual purchase of tickets to an
amusement park or a musical summer theater event during the term of a labor
contract, since such had been a binding past practice and a result of contract negotiations); Everlock Charlotte, 81-1 Arb. (CCH) 8034 (1980) (Butler, Arb.) (removal of all chairs from manufacturing department was proper by company in order
to improve production and meet competition, despite the Union's claim of a binding
past practice that chairs be allowed in the department); Redford Township, 80-2 Arb.
(CCH) 8596 (1980) (Coyle, Arb.) (township's action in unilaterally establishing a
winter and summer vacation for its firefighters was improper where the determination
of vacations had been historically left to officers of the bargaining unit); Beecher,
Peck & Lewis, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 489 (1980) (Lipson, Arb.) (employer did not
have right under the management rights clause or any other clause of the collective
bargaining agreement to unilaterally obtain a new insurance carrier for health and
welfare benefit plan, since contract provision concerning insurance benefits included
the selection of the carrier); Hooker Chemicals, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 96 (1980) (Gootnick, Arb.) (employer failed to comply with its contractual obligation not to amend
or modify retirement program without first notifying and consulting with the Union
when it failed to notify the Union before modifying pension reduction factors); State
of Alaska, 79-2 Arb. (CCH) 8590 (1979) (Hauck, Arb.) (state employer had no
right under management rights clause and violated the collective bargaining agreement, including the Union recognition clause, when it unilaterally implemented a rent
increase affecting state-controlled employee housing without first obtaining the ap-
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arbitrator's decision could differ significantly depending upon which of the
following he or she might hold:
(1) "I find for the aggrieved employees on the basis of my interpretation of the provisions of the contract."
(2) "I find for the aggrieved employees on the basis of my interpretation of the provisions of the contract read in light of Section 7 of the
NLRA."
(3) "I find for the aggrieved employees on the basis of my interpre'8 6
tation of Section 7 of the NLRA."
In the first instance a court should consider the legitimacy of the award
only under the Enterprise Wheel essence standard since the arbitrator has
made a strict contractual determination. 87 Thus so long as there is the necessary link between the award and the collective bargaining agreement, a
court should go no further into a review of the merits of the decision. As
to the second finding, the arbitrator has used statutory law as a source in
determining what the intent of the parties was on this issue when they entered
into the labor contract. Clearly this is a proper point of reference, since an
arbitrator can assume that the parties to the agreement knew the affect of
the NLRA and foresaw its application in the interpretation of the specific
contractual provisions.88 Indeed, courts have approved the utilization of public law as a basis of contractual interpretation even where arbitrators have
proval of its employees); Continental Forest Indus., Plant No. 536, 79-2 Arb. (CCH)
8540 (1979) (Williams, Arb.) (employer allowed to unilaterally eliminate the use of
manlifts at its paper mills under the management rights clause allowing company to
determine the means of production and its responsibility to remedy dangerous conditions at the plant in response to a fatal accident on the manlift at another mill).
86. See W. OBEP.BR, K. HANSLOWE, J. ANDERSON & T. HEwNsz, LABOR LAW:
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SocIETY 648 (3d ed. 1986).
87. Indeed, in Enterprise Wheel, the Court noted that "[arbitrators have no
obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award." 363 U.S. at 598. Thus
such a terse award would be proper under the Trilogy standards.
88. Using legal principles as a source of interpretation was specifically approved by the Supreme Court in Enterprise Wheel. 363 U.S. at 597-98. As one
commentator has stated:
Unless the parties specifically limit the powers of the arbitrator in deciding
various aspects of the issues submitted to him, it is often presumed that
they intend to make him the final judge on any questions which arise in the
disposition of the issue, including not only questions of fact but also questions of contract interpretation, rules of interpretation, and questions, if
any, with respect to substantive law.
F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURi, supra note 4, at 366; see also 0. FmIRWEATHER, supra
note 40, at 447-58; Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration,in Proc. of the 21st
Ann. Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERicAN AND FOREION ARBITRATION, at 49 (1968).
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been erroneous in the legal conclusions drawn.8 9 It is generally the reasoning
of the overturned judicial opinion or amended statute which has persuaded
the decision making process of the arbitrator. If the decision is grounded
primarily in the contract, even though the rationale of public law principles
were considered by the labor arbitrator, then a court should make no further
inquiry into the merits. For the most part, the adequacy of the arbitrator's
conclusion or the legitimacy of the reasoning for the award become irrelevant.
in other words, a reviewing court once again should apply the essence standard.
In the third instance, the arbitrator has disregarded the collective bargaining agreement and relied solely upon public law. Under Enterprise Wheel
and Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., the arbitrator has put the award at
risk.90 The arbitrator was not requested to tell the parties how the National
Labor Relations Board would decide the outcome, but how the contract
requires the parties to act. In this situation, regardless of whether the arbitrator is right or wrong in the statement of external law, the decision quite
likely is improper.
An example is Wilmington Typographical Union No. 123 v. News-Journal Company.9' There the parties had a collective bargaining agreement which
allowed the employer to require involuntary retirement of employees once
they reached a certain age. According to the labor contract, prior to January
1, 1979, the mandatory retirement age of employees was to be 65 years, and
89. Courts reason that the national labor policy favoring arbitration dictates
that as long as an arbitration award represents a reasonable interpretation of the
contract, it should be enforced notwithstanding legal errors short of a manifest disregard of the law. As explained by Judge Harry Edwards in American Postal Workers
Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1986):
[T]he parties may not seek relief from the courts for an alleged mistake of
law by the arbitrator. They have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's
interpretation without regard to whether a judge would reach the same result
if the matter were heard in court. The parties' remedy in such cases is the
same remedy they possess whenever they are not satisfied with the arbitrator's performance of his or her job: negotiate a modification of the contract
or hire a new arbitrator.
Id. at 6-7; see also Jones Dairy Farm v. Local No. P-1236, United Food & Commercial
Workers Int'l Union, 760 F.2d 173, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
136 (1985); American Federation of Tel. & Radio Artists v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
745 F.2d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 1984); Local Union 59, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Green Corp., 725 F.2d 264, 268-69 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984);
George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 354, 722 F.2d 1471,
1477 (9th Cir. 1984); Sobel v. Hertz Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir.
1972).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
91. 513 F. Supp. 987 (D. Del. 1981); see also United States Steel & Carnegie
Pension Fund v. McSkimming, 759 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1985) (court overturns arbitrator
as exceeding his authority by basing opinion on interpretation of ERISA rather than
the pension plan agreement).
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thereafter 70 years. On December 31, 1978, the company terminated the
grievant who had just reached age 65. The arbitrator concluded that, although
the language of the agreement would justify the forced retirement, this clause
was contrary to the terms of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and ordered the grievant reinstatedY2 The court vacated the decision since
the arbitrator had based his determination solely on statutory law and in
violation of the collective agreement. In such a case it was not only that the
arbitrator had used statutory law as the sole justification for his decision,
but also that he had disregarded the contrary, applicable contract provisions. 93
If an arbitrator steps out of the designated role of contract interpreter
and into the position of public law advocate and, in so doing, disregards the
labor contract, courts must void the award under the EnterprisePlus standard. The parties understood and submitted to the arbitrator an issue of
contractual interpretation. To receive a "non-ordered" package of public
policy interpretations is contrary to their primary, underlying expectations
when they negotiated and agreed to an arbitration clause to resolve contract
disputes. In such a case the court must return the "damaged goods" to the
arbitrator.
The second situation of the EnterprisePlusstandard is where the decision
of the arbitrator allegedly conflicts with public policy. This occurs in a case
where the parties may not have stipulated that the arbitrator should decide
the matter on external law grounds or the arbitrator may not have even
considered such law. However, once the arbiter issues the decision, then one
party challenges the award as contrary to public policy.
Not surprisingly, in light of W.R. Grace such objections have become
more commonplace.9 4 The danger, of course, is that notions of public policy
are often in the eye of the beholder. The public weal can be a broad and
amorphous concept. The Court recognized this in W.R. Grace and limited
the exception to instances of "well defined" public policy which could be
ascertained "by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interest. ' 95 Yet such limits can be
hard to apply in concrete cases. Legislatures and courts speak often and
broadly. It is not too difficult for an enterprising attorney to find a specific
statutory or judicial violation in an arbitral decision.
The perils of such a standard are demonstrated in cases such as Amalgainated Meatcutters Local Union No. 540 v. Great Western Food Com92. 513 F. Supp. at 988.
93. Id. at 989-90.
94. See supra note 15.
95. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945));
see also supra text accompanying notes 76-84.
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pany.96 There the arbitrator reinstated an employee who had been discharged
for overturning his eighteen wheel truck rig. The arbitrator found that the
company had not met the burden of proving that the accident was caused
by other than a faulty steering mechanism as alleged by the grievant. However, the arbitrator denied back pay since the employee admitted that he had
taken a drink at a rest stop shortly before the accident. 97 The Fifth Circuit
vacated the award of reinstatement under the W.R. Grace public policy
exception. The court found that the arbitrator's decision violated "the public
policy of preventing people from drinking and driving [as] embodied in the
caselaw, the applicable regulations, statutory law, and pure common sense. " 98
More specifically, the court pointed to a Federal Motor Carriers Safety Regulation which prohibited persons from consuming alcohol within four hours
of operating a motor vehicle. 99 One cannot quarrel that there is a definite
public policy against drinking and driving-indeed laws specifically prohibit
persons from driving greater than 65 miles per hour on public highways, °°
from driving on the wrong side of the road,'1' from driving without utilizing
the highest degree of care, 0 2 from using marijuana, 03 from working in certain
areas without safety glasses, 1 4 from stealing, 05 and from engaging in a host
of other specific actions. However, simply finding a violation of a well
defined and definite public policy should not be sufficient to set aside an
arbitrator's decision in a termination case such as Great Western Food. If
it were, then once a court finds the external law infraction, the discharge
6
must stand regardless of arbitral notions as to causation and just cause.'0
A better example of the use of the public policy exception is Local No.
P-1236, Amalgamated Meatcutters v. Jones Dairy Farm.0 7 There an arbi96.
97.
98.
99.

712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 123-24.
Id. at 125.
49 C.F.R. § 392.5 (1986).
100. 23 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
101. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.634 (West Supp. 1987); TENN.

CODE ANN. § 55-8-115 (1980); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301 (Purdon 1977); TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(d) § 52 (Vernon 1977).
102. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 21950, 23103, 40000.15 (West 1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, paras. 7-101, 11-503 (Smith-Hurd 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
304.010 (Vernon Supp. 1987); N.Y. VEH. & TAM. LAW §§ 1101, 1146, 1190 (McKinney 1986).
103. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West Supp. 1987); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1402 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
152.09 (West Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-20 (West Supp. 1987).
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.102 (1986).
105. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-4-2 (Burns Supp. 1987); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:67 (West 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30 (West Supp.
1986); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 (Page 1987).

106.

See infra text accompanying notes 113-25.

107.

680 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1982).
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trator had upheld a company rule prohibiting employees in a meat processing
plant from dealing directly with inspectors from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture concerning unsanitary conditions. The Seventh Circuit vacated
the decision as violative of public policy embodied in the Meat Inspection
Act that persons be allowed to report unsanitary acts. I08 Here, unlike the
Great Western Food case, there was a causal connection between the underlying contractual finding, i.e., an employee could not report an unsanitary
condition, and the public policy embodied in a statute requiring such reports.' °9 The contrary finding of the arbitrator was a direct impingement
upon the individuals' statutory right and, as such, was properly set aside on
the grounds of public policy.
A somewhat similar situation arose in American Postal Workers Union
v. United States PostalService." 0 An arbitrator found that a postal worker
had participated in an illegal strike, but ordered reinstatement without backpay due to mitigating circumstances."' The Ninth Circuit held that the award
of reinstatement was directly contrary to a federal statute prohibiting the
employment of a federal employee who "participates in a strike ... against
the Government of the United States."" 2 The court determined that such a
remedy would require the employer to commit an illegal act. In such an
instance the court stated that the congressional mandate must supersede the
arbitrator's ruling.' Public policy certainly dictates that no contract can be
4
valid which mandates unlawful action by a party."
However, if not carefully considered, the concept of public policy can
be used as a means to review awards in a fashion beyond that contemplated
in Enterprise Wheel and W.R. Grace. An example of such mischief is Misco,
108. 21 U.S.C. §§ 602, 608 (1982).
109. As the court stated:
The public policy involved here dictates that: (1) it is essential that the health
and welfare of consumers be protected by assuring that meat and meat food
products are unadulterated; (2) meat and meat food products be inspected
to prevent traffic in diseased and unwholesome meats; (3) standards of
sanitation be enforced throughout the plant; and (4) USDA inspectors and
the Company be encouraged to join forces to maintain such standards of
sanitation.
680 F.2d at 1145.
110. 682 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983).
111. The arbitrator mitigated the penalty of discharge because the grievant
acted "under erroneous assumptions" about the legality of the strike and "subsequently abandoned the strike." In addition, the arbitrator stated that "the penalty
of discharge is too severe in view of Grievant's potential for becoming a valuable
Postal Service employee, and particularly in view of the destructive effect that sustaining the discharge would in all likelihood have upon his prospects for future
employment." 682 F.2d at 1284.
112. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1982).
113. 682 F.2d at 1285.
114. Id. at 1286.
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Inc. v. United Paperworkers International Union."5 In that case the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the denial of an arbitrator's award reinstating an employee
who operated what the court considered "an unusually dangerous machine,"" 6 and whom the company had discharged for allegedly violating its
rules against possession or use of narcotics or controlled substances on plant
premises." 7 The arbitrator determined that the grievant was alone in the back
seat of another person's automobile after two co-workers had left the car.
There was a lit marijuana cigarette in the front-seat ash tray when the grievant
was apprehended. The arbitrator found no evidence that the employee had
smoked the marijuana cigarette. Further, the arbitrator refused to allow the
company to place into evidence testimony that in the grievant's automobile
there was a plastic scale case containing a non-usable trace of marijuana
since the company was unaware of this fact at the time of the employee's
discharge until shortly before the arbitration hearing. The arbitrator concluded that the termination was without just cause, as required by the contract. "

The majority overturned the arbitral finding excluding the evidence regarding the residue of marijuana." 9 The judges concluded that, even though
there was only an unusable trace of marijuana in the grievant's automobile,
this demonstrated possession of the controlled substance in violation of the
company rule. 20 This holding overlooks the commonly accepted view of
115. 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 871 (1987); see
also Oil Workers Local 4-228 v. Union Oil Co. of California, 818 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.
1987). In Union Oil Co., the Fifth Circuit upheld an arbitrator's decision sustaining
the discharge of one employee for the use and sale of drugs off company premises
and not on company time while upholding a second arbitrator's decision reinstating
an employee who had also used and sold drugs off company premises and not on
company time. The court agreed with the reasoning of the second arbitrator that the
probability of the second employee using or selling drugs in the future was too low
to merit discharge and did not violate any public policy since that employee would
not present the safety risk as was present in the Misco case. The court, however, did
remand the reinstatement decision concerning the second employee to the arbitrator
for a determination whether subsequent, post-award drug use by the employee rendered enforcement of the initial award of reinstatement as against public policy.
116. 768 F.2d at 740.
117. Id.at 741.
118. Id.at 740-41.
119. The court chided the arbitrator for "an opinion perhaps most kindly
described as whimsical." 768 F.2d at 740. The court also noted that the arbitrator
was not a lawyer. Id. at 741 n.2. The court went on to determine that "[i]t is true
that the company did not know of the [police] officer's discovery [of the unusable
trace of marijuana in the grievant's car] until shortly before arbitration began, but
the real issue in this case is not when the company learned of the incident, but
whether reinstatement is appropriate at this point." Id. at 742.
120. The court found that the rule prohibiting narcotics or controlled substances on the plant premises "draws no distinction between 'residue' and 'usable
quantities,' nor need it do so." Id.
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arbitrators that "[w]here a discharge occurs, its propriety must be determined
from an analysis of the cause for the discharge, and evidence of misconduct
discovered after the discharge cannot be presented to justify the discharge
2
action."''
The majority then determined that the award also violated a public policy
"against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol."' 22 To reach such a conclusion the court had to
make a number of factual determinations, none of which had been found
by the arbitrator: that the grievant had in fact smoked marijuana;'2 that the
grievant had utilized the drug to the point where he was under its influence;
and that the grievant then proceeded to perform his work duties in such a
condition. Such a misguided factual interpretation of the evidence substitutes
the judgment of judges for that of the arbitrator, whom the parties had
chosen to resolve the dispute.
There is a more fundamental flaw with a case such as Misco than simply
a judicial, rather than arbitral, determination of facts. In this case the arbitrator's award of reinstatement of the employee did not infringe on the
legal rights of the employer nor did it require the employer to commit an
illegal act. Nevertheless, by injecting a general notion of public policy, even
though founded upon specific statutory authority, as a basis to set aside an
arbitral award, the court makes suspect many decisions of labor arbitrators.
This is particularly true in discharge cases, where public policy considerations often intertwine with notions of just cause. These contract provisions
protecting employees from unwarranted termination from their jobs and
livelihood require more than a finding that the fired worker committed the
misconduct-even activity implicating such public policy issues as use or
121. 0. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 40, at 303-04; see, e.g., General Elec. Co.,
74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 125, 128 (1979) (Clark, Arb.); Price Bros., 61 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 587, 589 (1973) (Howlett, Arb.); see also E. ELKOUR= & F. ELKOURI, supra
note 4, at 675-76.
122. 768 F.2d at 743.
123. The court did not directly dispute the arbitrator's finding that the lit
marijuana cigarette was in the front seat ashtray, while the grievant was sitting in
the backseat of the car, but the court stated:
We note in passing that, although lacking personal experience in such matters, we had thought it common knowledge that the narcotic effect of marijuana can be obtained by simply sitting in a small enclosure where smoke
from it is present. It is not clear from the record whether or not the car
windows were closed, but - given that the incident occurred on an evening
in late January - it is a reasonable inference that they were.
768 F.2d at 741. This approach not only includes factual findings not made by the
arbitrator, but also overlooks contrary evidence that passive inhalation can cause one
to be under the influence of drugs. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT
- DRUG TESTING 29-30 (1986); Perez-Rayes, Guiseppi, Mason & Davis, Passive Inhalation of Marijuana Smoke and Urinary Excretion of Cannabinoids, 34 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS

No. 1, at 36 (1983).
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possession of drugs or alcohol,'- safety violations,'2 theft, 126 assault and
fighting, 27 threats,'2 falsifying records, 29 engaging in illegal strikes, 30 and
124. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Heinsz, Arb.)
(improper discharge despite positive results after random, mandatory drug test); Durian Co., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1127 (1985) (Coyne, Arb.) (improper discharge for
intoxication due to lack of evidence); Freeman United Coal Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
861 (1984) (Roberts, Arb.) (proper discharge of grader operator in extreme state of
intoxication who injured himself and damaged equipment in on-the-job accident);
Hussman Refrigerator Co., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 558 (1984) (Mikrut, Arb.) (discharge
upheld of employee for possession of plastic bag of marijuana in his car parked on
company property); Mallinckrodt, Inc., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1261 (1983) (improper
discharge of employees who shared marijuana cigarette while on break); Refining
Co., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 196 (1982) (Saracino, Arb.) (improper discharge of employee
for bringing beer on company premises and allegedly reporting to work under the
influence of alcohol); Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1104
(1982) (Traynor, Arb.) (proper discharge of guard at nuclear plant for having marijuana seeds in his locker); Renaissance Center Partnership, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 379
(1981) (Daniel, Arb.) (discharge of security officer who smoked marijuana with coworker while on duty upheld); Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 899
(1980) (Belshaw, Arb.) (proper discharge of employee found to be under the influence
of alcohol); Hooker Chem. Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1032 (1980) (Grant, Arb.)
(discharge of employee for possession and use of marijuana in plant sustained); St.
Joe Minerals Corp., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1193 (1979) (McDermott, Arb.) (proper
discharge of employee for absenteeism due to alcoholism).
125. Alumax Mill Prods., Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 539 (1982) (Anderson,
Arb.) (discharge of employee sustained who improperly left trainee in charge while
employee took coffee break when molten aluminum spilled on floor); Kroger Co.,
75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 290 (1980) (Berns, Arb.) (proper discharge of meat cutter who
ignited apron of co-worker while using knife to trim meat); Chayes-Virginian, Inc.,
71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 993 (1978) (Davis, Arb.) (discharge too severe for employee's
failure to wear safety glasses as required).
126. Carnation Co., 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 80 (1985) (Wright, Arb.) (improper
discharge of union steward for theft of fourteen legal pads he had obtained from
supply room with intent of using them for company-union conferences); Fisher Foods,
Inc., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 505 (1984) (Abrams, Arb.) (discharge too severe a penalty
for produce manager making unauthorized long distance calls on employer's phones);
Food Giant, Inc., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 833 (1982) (Dallas, Arb.) (discharge upheld
of employee who put tomato in his pocket that had fallen from cart); Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 373 (1981) (Hoban, Arb.) (proper discharge of
employee who took a bag containing government items); Clark Oil & Refining Corp.,
73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 702 (1979) (Franke, Arb.) (discharge upheld of employee for
theft of company tools which police had seized from employee's automobile).
127. Marco Mfg. Co., 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 134 (1985) (Richman, Arb.) (discharge of employee for fighting with fellow employee and making no attempt to
evade confrontation upheld); Apex Int'l Alloys, Inc., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 747 (1984)
(Wright, Arb.) (discharge of employee who struck another employee when provoked
improper); Harris Trucking Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 352 (1983) (Sabo, Arb.) (discharge of employee for fighting improper since employee had been struck by subcontractor's employee and had been subjected to verbal harassment and assault for
a year); Marquette Inn, 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1259 (1982) (Flagler, Arb.) (discharge
of larger employee who assaulted smaller employee proper); Gerber Prods. Co., 77
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the like. For the discharge to stand, the cause must also be just. 3 ' Arbitrators,

Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1217 (1981) (Hays, Arb.) (discharge of employee for fighting with
co-workers proper despite contention that co-worker threw jar lids at and pushed
dolly towards employee); Union Camp Corp., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 866 (1979) (Duff,
Arb.) (discharge of employee who punched union committeeman upheld).
128. Solar Turbines, Inc., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 293 (1985) (Kaufman, Arb.)
(discharge of employee for allegedly threatening fellow employee improper); Marquette Inn, 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1259 (1982) (Flagler, Arb.) (discharge of doorman
for assault on co-worker which was instigated by "fighting words" upheld); St. Regis
Paper Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1281 (1980) (Kaufman, Arb.) (discharge of employee
who threatened to rape a co-worker proper); Pioneer Transit Mix Co., 72 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 206 (1979) (Darrow, Arb.) (discharge of union steward who threatened a truck
driver upheld).
129. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 834 (1985) (Williams, Arb.)
(discharge upheld for employee who failed to state on employment application that
previous employer had fired him for problems with supervisors); Golden Eagle Distribs., Inc., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 279 (1985) (D'Spain, Arb.) (discharge of employee
for allegedly falsifying time card overturned); Owens-Illinois, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1265 (1984) (Cantor, Arb.) (discharge of employee for failing to include information
concerning back injury on employment application found proper); Plough, Inc., 80
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1005 (1983) (Flannagan, Arb.) (discharge of employee for allegedly
falsifying company records improper); United States Steel Corp., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
354 (1980) (Simpkins, Arb.) (discharge of employee who cited divine inspiration for
falsifying employment application so as not to reveal that he had been under psychiatric care upheld); Gardner-Denver Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1126 (1978) (Dunn,
Arb.) (discharge of employee for falsifying employment application by omitting information concerning felony conviction held proper).
130. Fraser Shipyards, Inc., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 129 (1982) (Greco, Arb.)
(discharge improper for employees who engaged in wildcat strike); Berc Bldg. Maintenance Co., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 487 (1981) (Pritzker, Arb.) (discharge of employee
for refusing to work and encouraging another employee to strike in protest against
late delivery of paychecks in violation of no-strike clause proper); Traverse City Iron
Works, 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 21 (1980) (Heinsz, Arb.) (discharge of employee for
cursing and threatening supervisor and for carrying picket sign that said "UAW on
Strike for Equity" that resulted in work stoppage upheld); Superior Switchboard &
Devices Divs., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1107 (1980) (Seinsheimer, Arb.) (discharge penalty
too severe for employees who actively led strike in violation of no-strike clause, since
supervisory employees did nothing to discourage strike); City of Tampa, Florida, 75
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 836 (1980) (Nachring, Arb.) (city employer improperly selected
sanitation worker for discharge for allegedly participating in or instigating illegal
work stoppage); Price Bros., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 748 (1980) (Laybourne, Arb.)
(discharge of employee who participated in wildcat strike to greater degree than other
strikers upheld); Quanex, Mac Steel Div., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 9 (1979) (McDonald,
Arb.) (discharge of employee who was one of primary agitators and leaders of illegal
walkout proper); Clinton Corn Processing Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555 (1978)
(Madden, Arb.) (employer properly discharged union executive board members, employees, and probationary workers who participated in illegal work stoppage resulting
from employer's refusal to reinstate employee who was discharged for theft of company property).
131. The concept of "just cause" for discipline and discharge of employees is
one of the most important principles in labor-management relations. Indeed, some
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like judges who must determine the sentence for or the probation of convicted
felons, must consider the terms of the punishment for the offense and whether
mitigation is in order. 132 Before the final penalty is assessed, the arbitrator
arbitrators have implied just cause limitations in collective bargaining agreements
even where there was no explicit provision. F.

ELKOURI

& E. ELKoURI, supra note 4,

at 652. A survey has shown that more than 90% of the major collective bargaining
agreements contain a "just cause" or a "cause" provision in regard to discipline and
discharge. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) § 40:1
(1983).
Although the notion of requiring just cause for discipline is well accepted in the
labor relations field, few collective bargaining agreements define the term any further.
Gene McKelvey, a noted arbitrator and authority in the field, has commented on the
concept as follows:
What is just cause? Unlike other substantive areas of contract construction
involving the interpretation and application of contract language to such
matters as seniority, wage rates, hours, and overtime and fringe benefit
entitlement, the determination of just cause involves a value judgment on
the part of the arbitrator. [One should consider] Lawrence Stessin's definition of just cause: "What a reasonable person, mindful of the habits and
customs of industrial life and standards of justice and fair dealing, would
decide." (Stessin 1973). Such a decision, Stessin elaborates, involves the use
of common sense and a knowledge of industrial standards governing employee deportment as well as of the common understanding governing the
relationship of the particular parties.
It should be obvious that these standards of common sense, reasonableness, and fair dealing are slippery and elusive, wholly lacking in objectivity and concreteness .... [H]owever, once just cause clauses were adopted,

arbitrators began to develop certain principles and criteria to apply to just
cause cases, thereby creating a body of common law that served to reduce
some of the elements of unpredictability and surprise that might otherwise
have made the process of arbitral review unacceptable to both parties.
Although collective bargaining agreements, the past practice of the
parties, and the particular facts of disciplinary incidents vary from case to
case, arbitrators in general analyze each case in terms of the following
considerations: (1) Was the alleged misconduct proved to the complete satisfaction of the arbitrator? (2) If so, was it of such a nature as to warrant
disciplinary action? (3) If the misconduct is proved, was it the result of
provocation or other extenuating circumstances that might mitigate the guilt
of the grievant? (4) Is there evidence that discrimination motivated the disciplinary action? (5) Was the misconduct of such a nature that it affected
the employer-employee relationship. . .? (6) Did the employer adhere to
principles of corrective or progressive discipline?
MCKELVEY, Discipline and Discharge, ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 89-91 (1984); see
also Abrams & Nolan, Toward a Theory of "'Just Cause" in Employee Discipline
Cases, 1985 DuKE L.J. 594.
132. See, e.g., Morgan Adhesives Co., 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1039 (1986) (Abrams,
Arb.) (employee reinstated whose absenteeism was due to alcohol problem, which
employee acknowledged and for which he sought treatment); Signal Delivery Serv.,
Inc., 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 75 (1985) (Weis, Arb.) (reinstatement without back pay
of truck driver who was involved in two accidents due to intoxication because of
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must evaluate factors such as the employee's work record, i.e., is the person
a first-time or chronic offender;'33 with what degree of intent or culpability
the employee acted;3 4 whether the rules have been equally enforced against
all employees;' 35 and whether the rehabilitation of the worker is a realistic
unblemished 22 year work record); Shell Oil Co., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 787 (1984)
(Allen, Arb.) (six day suspension for absenteeism improper where employee previously
had received a written warning notice and then maintained a good absence record
for eight months); see also F. ELKouRI & E. ELKOuri, supra note 4, at 670-88; Abrams
& Nolan, supra note 131, at 608-09, 611-12, 621-22.
133. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 567 (1985) (Penfield,
Arb.) (suspension of employee for refusing callout upheld, even though on a date he
was sick, since he had failed to tell his supervisor that he was sick and he had received
numerous warnings about refusals to accept callouts); Shell Oil Co., 83 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 787 (1984) (Allen, Arb.) (improper penalty of six day suspension for excessive
absenteeism where employee had maintained a good record for eight months after
written warning); Van Dyne-Crotty Co., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1209 (1983) (Murphy,
Arb.) (discharge of employee for tardiness upheld when he had another employee
punch his card to avoid being late since employee had received four written warning
notices within 12-month period); Dahlstrom Mfg. Co., 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 302 (1982)
(Gootnick, Arb.) (discharge of employee for drinking on the job upheld, since employee was given "last chance" return to work from earlier termination due to alcohol
problems); Rohr Indus., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 273 (1980) (Weiss, Arb.) (proper discharge of employee for distributing newspaper of socialist workers' party in the work
area after warning that such distribution violated plant rules); Bethlehem Steel Co.,
72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1036 (1979) (Aronin, Arb.) (improper suspension of employee
for absenteeism since two prior warnings in employee's file were not related to absenteeism).
134. Porter Equip. Co., 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1082 (1985) (Lieberman, Arb.)
(improper suspension of employee for failure to follow instructions, since employee
was a Vietnamese who did not speak or understand English very well); Potlatch Corp.,
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 445 (1984) (Kapsch, Arb.) (discharge upheld of employee who
fraudulently attempted to obtain reimbursement for hunting boots which he claimed
were safety boots); Whitehall-Coplay School Dist., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 325 (1981)
(Quinn, Arb.) (proper suspension and written reprimand to teacher who recklessly
risked students' safety by requiring them to finish an examination during a bomb
threat); see also Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers Local 5089, 823 F.2d
1289 (9th Cir. 1987) (arbitrator's interpretation of contractual clause that required
just cause for discharge to encompass a mental fault element was proper).
135. Georgia Pac. Corp., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 179 (1983) (Szollosi, Arb.)
(discharge of employee who left plant allegedly due to illness was proper even though
other employees left plant for same reason); W.R. Case & Sons Cutlery Co., 80 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 902 (1983) (Hewitt, Arb.) (employer improperly suspended and demoted
employee for poor performance when no other employees had been disciplined for
poor quality work performance); Litton Microwave Cooking Prods., 75 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 724 (1980) (O'Connell, Arb.) (employer discriminated against militant union
adherent who participated in strike when it refused to reimburse employee for damage
to truck parked on company lot after returning from strike, when non-striking employees and others were reimbursed for damage to their vehicles during strike); Anderson Elec. Connectors, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 214 (1980) (Hardin, Arb.) (rule
prohibiting foundry employees who are continuously exposed to traces of airborne
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possibility. 36 In other words, before sustaining a discharge, even for actions
involving a violation of explicit external law, an arbitrator is duty-bound
under a just cause clause to consider all of the pertinent facts and circumstances. Courts under the guise of public policy should not usurp this critical
arbitral function.
When the interpretation of a labor agreement implicitly or even explicitly
involves considerations of external law, it should be done by the arbitrator.
It is the arbitrator's decision that the parties have negotiated for and intended
when they agreed that their contractual disputes would be resolved by final
and binding arbitration rather than economic weapons or court actions. Where
a company and a union agree to allow an arbitrator to determine whether a
discharge is for just cause and the appropriateness of the remedy, the arbitrator, and not a court, should decide the weight to be given to public
policy considerations. As noted by Judge Harry Edwards, a former labor
arbitrator and member of the National Academy of Arbitrators,137 in a case
lead from eating and drinking in foundry while permitting others to eat or drink
while passing through foundry, upheld); Mobil Oil Corp., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 143
(1980) (Herman, Arb.) (penalty of 20-day suspension too severe for black employee
who was charged with violating company rules, where customary discipline for similar
infractions varied from written reprimands to 3-5 day suspensions); Price Bros., 74
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 748 (1980) (Laybourne, Arb.) (discharge of employee who participated in wildcat strike to greater degree than other employees upheld).
136. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1001 (1987) (Heinsz, Arb.)
(improper discharge despite positive results after random drug test when employer
failed to abide by mandatory drug abuse counselling program); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 781 (1987) (Morgan, Arb.) (discharge too severe
for employee with excessive tardiness and absenteeism due to use of drugs and alcohol,
since employee had rejected intoxicants and had sought professional help in rehabilitation efforts); Ohio River Co., 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 211 (1984) (Hewitt, Arb.)
(discharge of deck hand who fell overboard due to intoxication found improper where
employee admitted alcohol problem and had joined Alcoholics Anonymous); Bemis
Co., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 733 (1983) (Wright, Arb.) (proper discharge of employee
for absenteeism that employee claimed was due to alcohol, since employer had previously reinstated employee after completing company-sponsored rehabilitation program); Indianapolis Rubber Co., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 529 (1982) (Gibson, Arb.)
(discharge overturned of employee who had accumulated sufficient points under absentee program for discharge, but all infractions were due to alcoholism and the
employer had never given the employee a chance to enroll in company-paid alcohol
rehabilitation program); Continental Airlines, Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 896 (1980)
(Ross, Arb.) (proper discharge of employee found sleeping on the job after he refused
to enter rehabilitation program for drugs and alcohol); St. Joe Minerals Corp., 73
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1193 (1979) (McDermott, Arb.) (discharge for excessive absenteeism
overturned of employee who was known to have alcohol problems at the time of
discharge but was not offered treatment opportunity by the company).
137. See Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation: Reflections of
a Judge, in Proc. of 35th Ann. Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, ARBITRATION
1982-CoDUCT

OF HEARING,

at 16.

The National Academy of Arbitrators is a profes-

sional organization of labor arbitrators who have been selected for membership on
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involving just such an issue of a court reviewing an arbitrator's reversal of
an employer's decision to terminate an employee despite a challenge that
such violated external law:
When construction of the contract implicitly or directly requires an application of 'external law,' i.e., statutory or decisional law, the parties have
necessarily bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the law and are
bound by it. Since the arbitrator is the 'contract reader,' his interpretation
of the law becomes part of the contract and thereby part of the private law
governing the relationship between the parties to the contract.'3 8
Only if the award directly infringes upon the positive law rights of the parties,
as in Jones Dairy Farm, or has the effect of mandating illegal conduct, as
in American Postal Workers Union, should courts overturn the award as a
violation of public policy. If not so limited, courts, as in Great Western
Food or Misco, will use the EnterprisePlus doctrine of public policy to usurp
the arbitral process in order to correct what they perceive as mistaken arbitral
awards. 3 9 As one commentator noted:
To the famous statement, "Public policy is an unruly horse and dangerous
to ride," Professor Corbin gave the unanswerable reply, "However unruly
the horse may be, it is not possible for the courts to refuse to ride." We
may criticize the courts for their horsemanship, but not for riding the horse
on which contract principles placed them.1'4
W.R. Grace requires courts to scrutinize arbitral opinions with public policy
in mind. However, a mere finding that an arbitral award implicates some
specific statutory or judicial rule should be an insufficient basis for overturning the decision. Otherwise the exception will be too broad and the
finality of arbitral decisions undermined. It is this finality, in addition to the
relative speed and flexibility of arbitration, that has caused parties to forgo
other means of dispute resolution such as strikes, lock-outs, or court litigation.' 4' This essential strength of the arbitration system will be significantly
diluted if the losing party knows that it has a good chance of having an
arbitral award overturned by invoking the talisman of public policy.
the basis of substantial and current experience as an arbiter of labor-management
disputes. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 20-21.
138. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d
1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
139. See supra note 83.
140. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J.
525, 557 (1969).
141. Since its earliest rulings, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
arbitration system is the "quid pro quo" for the no-strike/no lockout promises in
the collective agreement. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957);
Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Boys
Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Gateway Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/1

34

1987]

LABOR ARBITRATION

Heinsz: Heinsz: Judicial Review of Labor

The Supreme Court in W.R. Grace not only concluded that the public
policy must be "explicit" and "well defined," but it must also be "dominant."1 42 In addition to finding some contrary law which may be on point,
a reviewing court should consider both causation and degree of infringement
upon the public policy before setting aside an arbitral award. Only in instances where an order of an arbitrator causes a party to violate an explicit
external law or where an arbitral award directly impinges upon the public
law rights of a person should a court utilize the public policy exception of
the EnterprisePlus standard.
The final circumstance of the Enterprise Plus doctrine under consideration here is where the parties by joint agreement confer upon the arbitrator
the authority to apply external law to their contractual dispute. 43 In such a
situation the employer and the union specifically request an interpretation
of their contract in light of public law. Here the arbitrator cannot avoid
utilizing public policy since the contractual issue has become encompassed
in the question of external law. Indeed, to refuse to consider outside statutes
or case law would be error since the arbitrator's authority is drawn from
and circumscribed by the agreement of the parties.' 44
In this third instance, a court should apply a different standard of review
to an arbitral award than when an arbitrator applies external law on his own
or where the award is alleged to conflict with public policy. Here the parties
by agreement have made a choice of laws as to how a contract issue will be
determined. This often occurs in commercial agreements. 4 However, in this
circumstance, rather than the law of New York or Texas or California, the
parties have requested application of the law of the arbitral system in light
of the pertinent external law considerations. 46 In such an instance, which
will be referred to as "devolution," courts should give much deference to
the arbitral award if certain safeguards and conditions are met. This standard
of review would be more akin to that under Enterprise Wheel rather than
EnterprisePlus.
First, the issue under the collective bargaining agreement must interrelate
clearly with the public law question. The arbiter cannot sit simply to decide
142. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 461
U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
143. The most common situation where such occurs is in regard to the "deferral" doctrine under the National Labor Relations Act. In Collyer Insulated Wire,
192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), the NLRB held that it would defer the decision in an unfair
labor practice case to the parties' arbitration mechanism where the parties agreed to
resort to arbitration and the meaning of the contract was at the center of the dispute
before the Board. Id. at 842; see R. GomAN, LABOR LAW 751-61 (1976); see also
George Banta Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 388 (1980) (Goldberg, Arb.); Michigan
Consol. Gas Co., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1058 (1972) (Shister, Arb.).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CON-ICTS §§ 186-188 (1971).
146. See Feller, supra note 9, at 106-07.
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public law disputes between the parties. For instance, a company and a union
could not expect an arbitrator to make a unit determinations under section
9 of the NLRA 47 or to decide whether a manufacturing process violated
standards promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency, 48 if such
issues had no relationship to their collective bargaining agreement.
Secondly the parties must inform the arbitrator at the outset of the
arbitral proceeding that he or she is to consider the contractual dispute in
light of external law. It would be inappropriate for the devolution principle
to apply where an arbitrator is unaware of the public law issue. For instance,
assume the parties submit to the arbitrator, under the just cause provision
of their contract, the validity of a company's discharge of an employee, who
is also a union steward, for allegedly engaging in a fight. 149 If the company
and the union do not inform the arbitrator or submit as an issue that,
regardless of the fight, there is a question as to whether the grievant was
terminated because of anti-union animus, one should not say that the arbitrator has decided this public law issue in determining whether the discharge
was for just cause.150
Thirdly the arbitral forum must be compatible with a full and fair presentation of the external law issue. Some legal questions simply require the
fact finding processes of the litigation system.' 5' In those instances parties
cannot simply contract away judicial determination, particularly where individual rights are involved. 5 2 Suppose a grievant alleges an improper denial
of a promotion under the terms of a provision in a labor agreement which
allows the company to make promotions solely on the basis of qualifications.
If the grievant claims racial discrimination in the application of the company
rule by proving on the basis of statistical data the disproportionate impact
of the neutral rule on minorities,' 53 the lack of adequate discovery tools in
147. Section 9(b) of the NLRA provides that "[tihe Board shall decide in each
case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the
rights guaranteed by this [Act], the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.....
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982); see, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S.
261 (1964).
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
149. See, e.g., Iowa Dep't of Gen. Servs., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 852 (1982)
(Mikrut, Arb.); Nickles Bakery, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 801 (1979) (Letson, Arb.);
Furr's, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 960 (1979) (Leeper, Arb.).
150. See, e.g., Nevins v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986).
151. Traditionally discovery procedures have been limited in arbitration cases.
One of the strengths of arbitration is its relative speed and informality. As a result,
courts and arbitrators have hesitated to incorporate the full panoply of discovery
procedures as exist in civil lawsuits. 0. FAmwiEAT-R, supra note 40, at 133-34.
152. See supra note 71.
153. In the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431,
(1971), the Supreme Court found that objective employment selection devices, such
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arbitration may be too great a barrier for devolution to occur. - 4 On the
other hand, simply because certain statutory rights present difficult and complex issues to an arbitrator should not ipso facto require complete judicial
disregard of the parties' selected method of resolution.
It is not the general nature of the issue but its precise characteristics
that should determine the propriety of the arbitral process and the extent of
judicial review. For example, in cases where an employee claims that a discharge was because of sex discrimination, a complaint filed with the Occupational Safety and Health Commission, or the filing of a workers'
compensation claim, individual statutory rights as well as contractual matters
would certainly be involved. However, arbitrators routinely decide such issues
of causation in discipline cases. 5 If the claim concerns the exact basis for
the company's action and whether disparate treatment occurred, an arbitrator's decision should not be dismissed by a court since the arbitral process
15 6
is sufficient to develop the underlying factual claims.

as tests, which are "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation" had an adverse
impact on minorities and were violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17. This disproportionate impact method of analysis
has been applied to numerous other employment criteria. See B. ScnLEi & P. GROSSzfAN,

supra note 73, at 80-205.

154. As the Supreme Court stated in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974), in determining that a federal court in a Title VII case was not bound
by a prior arbitration award:
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as
complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures
common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.
Id. at 57-58; see also supra note 74.
155. See, e.g., Customs Serv., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 777 (1983) (Allen, Arb.)
(denial of female employee's shift request claimed to be on basis of sex discrimination); United Technologies Corp., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 92 (1982) (Bloch, Arb.) (application of non-discrimination clause in contract with regard to handicapped employee);
Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1171 (1982) (Koven, Arb.) (application of handicap anti-discrimination laws in regard to allegations of employer
discrimination against employees who were unable to perform full scope of duties
under job descriptions); Flint Bd. of Educ., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 244 (1981) (Daniel,
Arb.) (employer not required to follow strict seniority when filling apprenticeship
program with female and minority applicants); Max Factor & Co., 73 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 742 (1979) (Jones, Arb.) (decision regarding female employees' claims that
affirmative action plan violated contractual seniority provisions); American Stevedoring Corp., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 559 (1979) (Ables, Arb.) (arbitrator rejected claims
that employees were discharged because of race and sex discrimination); County of
Santa Clara, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 290 (1978) (Koven, Arb.) (decision regarding allegations of sex discrimination in reclassification of female employees); Page Dairy
Co., 42 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1051 (1964) (Kiroff, Arb.) (allegation that employee was
discharged after filing several workers' compensation claims).
156. Such issues as motive, causation, and credibility can be adequately raised
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In determining the deference to be given the arbitral process in public
policy cases, courts have also alluded to the competence of arbitrators, particularly those who are not attorneys.'5 7 This issue is probably less troublesome in actual practice. Despite the accolades of arbitral omniscience by
Justice Douglas in the Trilogy as to industrial relations in the shop, 58 arbitrators often are presented with issues outside of their individual expertise.
Routinely labor arbitrators must decide matters requiring an understanding
of the intricacies of an operation 59 or the rapidly developing technology of
an industry' 60 of which he or she had no knowledge prior to arriving at the
hearing. The parties in their own self interest either will choose an expert on
the matter involved' 6' or will educate the arbiter as to the complexities of
the situation. Not surprisingly, the same process occurs when a case involves
a matter of public law. If resolution requires the special analytical competence
and resolved through the grievance-arbitration procedures. See Heinsz, An Arbitrator's Authority to Subpoena: A Power in Need of Clarification,in Proc. of the 38th
Ann. Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, ARBITRATION 1985, LAW AND PRACTICE
at 201 (1986).
157. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 n.18 (1974);
Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739, 741 n.2 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 871 (1987).
158. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
581-83 (1960).
159. See, e.g., Glenmore Distilleries Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1043 (1983)
(bourbon whiskey distillery); Peoria Water Co., 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 478 (1983)
(Fitzsimmons, Arb.) (electronic leak detection); Bell Tel. Co., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
750 (1980) (Garrett, Arb.) (self contained electronic switching system); Printing Indus.
of Metro. Washington, D.C., Inc., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 838 (1978) (Ables, Arb.)
(Heidelberg five color, offset, perfecting printing press); Leavenworth Times, 71 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 396 (1978) (Bothwell, Arb.) (publishing company converted from hotmetal to cold-metal type setting process); Kansas City Power & Light Co., 71 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 381 (1978) (Elkouri, Arb.) (computer programming and system design);
Continental Oil Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 185 (1978) (Towers, Arb.) (company introduced new large reactors permitting merger of vinyl dryers department and large
reactors department).
160. See supra notes 10-11.
161. There are a variety of methods for selecting arbitrators. Often arbitrators
are chosen by mutual agreement between the parties. In other instances, parties will
designate agencies such as the American Arbitration Association or the Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service to provide lists of names of arbitrators to hear disputes.
Sometimes parties agree on a single individual to serve as a permanent umpire to
handle all arbitration disputes or a permanent panel of arbitrators from whom they
will select an individual to hear a particular matter. In other instances parties select
arbitrators on an ad-hoc basis as disputes arise. See F. ELKou & E. ELKOURI, supra
note 4, at 118-37; 0. FAmWEATHMR, supra note 40, at 79-96; C. UPDEc-RAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 102-07 (3d ed. 1970). Further, there are numerous
services that list the qualifications of arbitrators. Thus, the parties are able to choose
an individual who can settle the type of dispute which they have encountered. Indeed,
evidence indicates that this selection of judges by the parties leads to a greater acceptability of decisions. Edwards, supra note 137, at 25.
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of an attorney, there are many lawyer-arbitrators from which parties can
choose.1 62 As to the non-attorney arbitrator, the parties can fully inform him
or her as to the underlying legal principles upon which the case should turn.
Another qualm often expressed with the arbitral process, particularly
when individual rights are concerned, is the aspect of union control of the
employee's grievance.1 63 However, once the case proceeds to the arbitration
stage, by definition the matter will be considered by a neutral outsider. That
arbitrator has a duty to insure a full and fair hearing,'6 and the nature of
the process tends to require both company and union representatives to
advocate their cause fully. Moreover, the duty of fair representation acts as
of an ara curb upon perfunctory presentation of a case and the tainting
1
bitrator's decision due to inadequate advocacy by a union. '
Thus, where the basis of the grievance claim involving public law can
be fully and fairly developed in the arbitral forum, devolution would be
proper. Further, since under this concept the parties must jointly submit the
external law issue to the labor arbitrator,1 66 the presumption should67 be in
favor of the parties' choice of forum and decision-making process.
Finally, for the devolution principle to apply, it must be shown that the
arbitrator considered the public policy issue and applied what might be described as "a" correct legal standard. 16 In delegating to an arbitrator the
external law question which intertwines itself with the contractual issue, a
company and union assume that the arbitrator will employ accepted legal
principles. This, of course, is somewhat of an overstatement since the law

162. C.

UPDEGRAFF,

supra note

161, at 108.

163. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974).
164. The code of professional ethics for labor arbitrators promulgated by the
National Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association and the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service specifically provides: "An arbitrator must
provide a fair and adequate hearing which assures that both parties have sufficient
opportunity to present their respective evidence and argument." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATIOR OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES Canon
5(A)(1), at 19 (1974). Moreover, the failure of an arbitrator to allow a party to
introduce material evidence at a hearing or an arbitrator acting in a partial manner
are grounds to set aside an award. 9 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1982).
165. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1976); Local
249, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Western Pennsylvania Motor Carriers Ass'n, 574
F.2d 783, 786 n.5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 828 (1978); Harrison v. Chrysler
Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, Rupe v.
Spector Freight Systems, 679 F.2d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 1982); Hart v. National Homes

Corp., 668 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1982).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
167. Moreover, in situations where the employee files the grievance which initiates the arbitration procedure, the worker too should be presumed to have chosen
the contractual dispute resolution procedures. See Peoples v. Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co., 638 F. Supp. 402 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
168. See infra text accompanying notes 171-86.
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on a particular matter might be uncertain, the parties might dispute which
legal standard is applicable, or the case may involve contested, mixed questions of law and facts. In such circumstances, the parties by jointly bringing
the issue before the arbitrator have also, in essence, conferred upon the
arbitrator the choice of which legal standard should be utilized. So long as
there is some support for this choice, and absent a manifest disregard of the
law, the arbitrator's decision should bind the parties.
Where the factors of devolution occur, a reviewing court should not
reject an arbitrator's award simply because a statutory public policy is also
involved. On the other hand, in a devolution situation a company and union
cannot expect only the limited "essence of the contract" review standard.
Their inclusion of the external law issue in the arbitral process means that
there is also a matter of public interest in the case which can transcend the
parties' private contract matter. 69 However, since there has been not only a
choice of forums but also, in a sense, a "choice of laws" or a "choice of
legal interpreters," the court should limit its review to determining whether
the four principles of devolution exist. 70 If so, the court should set aside the
award only when there is a clearly erroneous application of the external law.
A good example of the operation of the devolution principle, as here
espoused, is in two cases from the Ninth Circuit, Broadway Cab Cooperative,
Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 281,17' and Teamsters Local No. 162 v.
Mitchell Brothers Truck Lines, 172 both of which involved similar external law
issues, applied the principle of devolution, but reached different results as
to the finality of an arbitrator's award. In both cases the companies and
unions had submitted to arbitration the issue of whether individuals, in
Broadway Cab, cab drivers and in Mitchell Brothers, truck drivers, were
employees or independent contractors for purposes of union security
agreements 73 and, if the individuals were not employees, whether the appli169. See supra note 75.
170. The principles of the devolution doctrine espoused here are: (1) the issue
being arbitrated under the collective bargaining agreement must interrelate with the
public law question, (2) the parties agreed to submit the contract issue in light of the
external law to the arbitrator; (3) arbitration must provide a full and fair forum for
the external law issue and (4) the arbitrator must consider the public policy issue and
apply a correct legal standard. See supra text accompanying notes 147-69.
171. 710 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1983).
172. 682 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1982).
173. Union security agreements are contractual arrangements between employers and unions which require employees to become members of or to pay financial

support to a union for representation and collective bargaining services. R. GonmAN,
supra note 143, at 639-76. The National Labor Relations Act specifically allows
such arrangements to require employees to become members of a union within thirty
days of hire. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982); see also Chicago Teachers Union Local
1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435
(1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); NLRB v. General Motors
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cation of the contract would require the companies to cease using the indi74
viduals' services in violation of Section 8(e) of the NLRA.'
In these cases the external law was clearly interrelated with the contractual questions. Further, the parties expressly submitted the issues to the
arbitrators to decide the contractual matters in light of external law considerations. Although both issues were complex legally as well as factually, the
arbitration process was sufficient to produce the necessary evidence for a
fair decision. Thus, the first three factors of the devolution theory were
present.
In both cases the arbitrators held that the individuals were employees
and, thus, there was no section 8(e) violation. The employers sought to vacate
both awards. In Mitchell Brothers the company argued that the arbitrator
had used an outmoded legal standard for the critical decision of whether the
truck drivers were employees or independent contractors. The court quite
properly looked at the legal standard and concluded that the arbitrator was
7
required by Supreme Court precedent to use a common law agency test.1 1
The arbitrator in his opinion stated that he had relied on the case of NLRB
v. Hearst Publication,7 6 which the court noted was "a case whose standard
for determining employee status was overruled by amendment of the Wagner
Act and by the case of NLRB v. United Insurance Co.'7 The court further

noted that the appropriate principle was the common law agency test for
determining employee or independent contractor status as illustrated in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency section 220.178Nevertheless, the court upheld
Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). Thus, individuals who are considered employees would
be required to maintain membership or pay dues in accordance with a union security
agreement; whereas, independent contractors would not be covered by such an agreement.
174. Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, in pertinent part, provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling,
using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of
any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and
any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing
such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void....
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982). This provision proscribes so-called "hot-cargo" agreements
causing an employer to enter into an agreement to engage in a secondary boycott.
W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE, J. ANDERSEN & T. HEmNsz, supra note 86, at 393; see
NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam & Gen. Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507 (1977); National
Woodwork Mfr. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
175. Local 162, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 682
F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1982).
176. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
177. 682 F.2d at 766 (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968)).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
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the arbitrator's award because "[t]he Arbitrator did, in fact, use the 'common-law agency test' in arriving at his decision.'

' 79

Even though the arbi-

trator cited an improper case and did not specifically state that he was using
United Insurance Company or the Restatement, the arbitrator based his decision upon the degree of control which the company exercised over the
employees and analyzed a number of other factors to determine whether
sufficient control existed.'8 0 This, the court found, was in essence the same
way the common law agency test would be applied. Once the court concluded
that the legal standard was a permissible one, it declined to review how the
arbitrator applied the standard since that would be the equivalent of a review
of the merits. The parties had delegated this decision to the arbitrator.
In Broadway Cab the court reversed the arbitrator's decision on essentially the same issue. Again the court reviewed the legal standard which the
arbitrator had applied in the case. The arbitrator found that, since the company had referred to the cab drivers as "employees" in the parties' agreement, the estoppel doctrine prevented the employer from asserting an
independent contractor status.'8' The court concluded that estoppel was an
impermissible method of deciding cases involving section 8(e) issues. The
reason for this was not because arbitrators cannot use the estoppel theory,8 2
but rather because the Supreme Court in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins,'83
noted that an adjudicator must consider an employer's section 8(e) defense
and cannot rely upon rules of estoppel. 8 4 According to the court, the particular legal standard chosen by this arbitrator was improper in light of the
Supreme Court's specific mandate to determine the merits of a section 8(e)
defense in such a situation. The court quite properly distinguished Mitchell
Brothers as follows:
Thus, in Mitchell Brothers we deferred to the arbitrator's resolution of the
employee/independent contractor issue, a legal decision based on factual
determinations, but engaged in an independent review of whether the legal
standard applied by the arbitrator was contrary to Supreme Court precedent.1"
179. 682 F.2d at 766 (emphasis in original).
180. Id.
181. Broadway Cab Coop. v. Local 281, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 710 F.2d
1379, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1983).
182. See, e.g., Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 854, 856 (Gibson, Arb.); Theodore Mayer & Bros., 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 540, 542 (1974) (Mac-.
Intosh, Arb.); Holland Die Casting & Plating Co., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 173, 176

(1972) (Howlett, Arb.); Continental Distilling Sales Co., 52 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1138,
1141 (1969) (Sembower, Arb.); see also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 4, at
399-401.
183.

455 U.S. 72 (1982).

184. 710 F.2d at 1383-84.
185.

Id.at 1383.
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Since the case directly involved a matter of public policy, the court was
correct under the devolution principle in determining the propriety of the
legal standard used by the arbitrator. But, whereas in Mitchell Brothers the
arbitrator had used a proper legal principle, in Broadway Cab the arbiter
had not. Thus, the latter decision could not stand.
The devolution doctrine will require a high level of sophistication and
diligence by all involved in the process - management and union represen6
tatives, arbitrators, and judges. The legal issues, such as hot cargo clauses,"
are often intricate and complex. The required presentation of applicable
statutory and caselaw principles in arbitration cases involving public policy
issues will undoubtedly increase the time and cost of such awards. Moreover,
once the arbitration decision is reached, there must be a careful balancing
of conflicting interests, particularly by reviewing courts, to insure that the
legal standard is not an impermissible one and that the other factors for
devolution are present, but without the court substituting its judgment on
the merits of the award.
This principle of devolution may have an increasing import, particularly
in cases involving deferral under the NLRA.Y7 Due to United Technologies
Corporation,' more cases involving individual statutory rights under sections
8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2)' 89 should be deferred by the NLRB
to the arbitration process under the Collyer doctrine. 90 For instance, in an
186. See supra note 174.
187. See supra note 143; see also Morris, NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration
Process:The Arbitrator'sAwesome Responsibility, in Proc. of the 37th Ann. Meeting,
Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, ARBITRATION-1984, at 51-76.

188. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
189. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in exercising their right to form labor
organizations, bargain collectively or engage in concerted activities. Section 8(b)(1)(A)
similarly makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of such rights. Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to discriminate against employees in order to encourage or discourage
membership in a union. Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
to cause an employer to commit such discrimination or for a union to discriminate
on such a basis. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2) (1982).
190. The Board's policy on deferring unfair labor practice charges other than
those under section 8(a)(5), which was the Himit of Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B.
837 (1971) (see supra note 143) has at best been a wavering one. In 1972 the Board
expanded the Collyer deferral policy to cover charges under sections 8(a)(1) and
(3)(8)(a) in a 3-2 decision. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527 (1972). In General
Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977), the Board again by 3-2 vote, deflated
the doctrine so as to encompass only section 8(a)(5). Chairman Murphy provided the
swing vote and noted the distinction between disputes essentially between the contracting parties, i.e., the company and the union, under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3)
and those involving individual rights of employees under sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3),
8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2). Id. at 810. In United Technologies Corp., 269 N.L.R.B.
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unfair labor practice charge where a union steward claims that he was discharged for his union activities rather than for engaging in a fight, the NLRB
now would defer to the arbitration process. Once the arbitrator made his or
her decision, the Board would determine the propriety of the resolution of
the statutory claim under Olin Corporation. 9' In that case the Board held
that it would defer to an arbitrator's decision even though the arbitrator did
not specifically rule on the unfair labor practice issue (1) if the contractual
issue was parallel to the unfair labor practice issue and the parties generally
presented the arbitrator with the facts underlying the unfair labor charge;
(2) that any differences between the contractual issue and the unfair labor
practice issue would go to the "clearly repugnant" standard, (3) as to the
"clearly repugnant" standard, the arbitrator's decision need not be totally
consistent with Board policy; and (4) that the Board would follow the arbitrator's decision unless the general counsel could prove that it was "palp' 92
ably wrong."'
557 (1984), by a 3-1 margin (there was one vacancy at the time), the Board returned
to the National Radio view that the deferral doctrine should include cases alleging
violations of individual rights under sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2).
191. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
192. 268 N.L.R.B. at 574. In Olin Corp., the Board departed from its prior
review standards for arbitration decisions outlined in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080 (1955). In Spielberg, the Board had found that it would defer to the award of
an arbitrator if: (1) the proceedings were fair and regular; (2) all of the parties agreed
to be bound by the decision; and (3) the decision was not "repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act." 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. Later, the Board also required that
the unfair labor practice issue before the Board had to be both presented to and
considered by the arbitrator. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980).
Under the Board's present view, as set forth in Olin Corp., the specific unfair labor
practice issue need be neither presented to nor considered by the arbitrator so long
as there is factual parallelism between the contractual issue and the unfair labor
practice issue. Further, under the Olin decision, the Board has determined that there
will be deferral unless the arbitration award is "palpably wrong," i.e., unless the
arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act.
The Board will "not require an arbitrator's award to be totally consistent with Board
precedent." 268 N.L.R.B. at 574, 576. For example, in Reichhold Chem., 275
N.L.R.B. 1414, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1037 (1985), the union contended that the
employer had improperly removed bargaining unit work in violation of the contract
and of the National Labor Relations Act when it converted three union employees
to supervisors. The Board held that deferral was required even though the arbitrator
refused to consider the unfair labor practice issue because the contract and statutory
issues were factually parallel. See also Ohio Edison Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 874, 118
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1429 (1985); Martin Readi-Mix, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 559, 118
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1425 (1985); United States Postal Serv., 275 N.L.R.B. 430, 119
L.L.R.M. (BNA) 1153 (1985). This new Olin doctrine of arbitral review by the N.L.R.B.
has caused controversy. A number of courts have refused to accept Board rulings
where an arbitrator did not rule on the unfair labor practice issue or reached a
conclusion contrary to that under the NLRA. Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); Nevins v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1986); Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d
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Under Olin Corporation it is conceivable that, if the arbitrator was
presented with evidence of the individual's status as a union steward and the
factual issues concerning the alleged fight, the Board would uphold the arbitrator's decision to discharge the person even if there had been no specific
claim at the arbitration proceeding that the discharge was motivated by union
activity and even though the arbitrator had made no specific ruling on this
issue. 193
Rather than appealing this case to the NLRB for review under Olin
Corporation, the losing party might also seek judicial review under section
301.194 Such a situation would be entirely compatible with the deferral doctrine. There should be no notions of preemption or exclusive NLRB
consideration 9" as to the arbitral decision that involves the statutory unfair
labor practice issue, since, as W.R. Grace makes clear, it is the courts which
are charged with insuring that arbitral decisions do not violate public policy. 19 6 Indeed, under the devolution principle a court should use a more
exacting standard of review than the factors developed by the NLRB in Olin
Corporation. At the outset, in order to determine whether devolution was
proper, the court would have to consider whether the parties actually submitted the statutory issue and whether it was specifically considered by the
arbitrator. 197 Even if such submission and consideration occurred, the court,
as occurred in Mitchell Brothers and Broadway Cab, would decide whether
the arbiter utilized a proper legal standard to determine causation and pretext
claims under NLRA principles. 198 If there was not adequate consideration of
1516 (11th Cir. 1986); Garcia v. NLRB, 785 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1986). But see Lewis
v. NLRB, 779 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1985). For further discussion of the Board's new
deferral policy, see Mack & Bernstein, NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process:
The Arbitrator'sDemanding Role, 40 ARB. J. Sept. 1985, at 33, and Morris, supra
note 187.
193. See, e.g., Anderson Sand & Gravel, 277 N.L.R.B. 127, 121 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1069 (1985), where a joint union-employer arbitration committee upheld the
discharge of two employees who allegedly engaged in a wildcat strike. The Board
deferred emphasizing that the contractual issue of whether the employees violated the
no-strike clause was factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue of whether
the employees' statutory right to strike had been waived by the no-strike clause, even
though the issue of waiver was not presented to the arbitration panel. See also Sachs
Elec. Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 121, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1269 (1986) (deferral to arbitration
committee decision upholding discharge of alleged union steward).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982).
195. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las
Vegas Culinary Workers Local 226 v. Royal Center, Inc., 796 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 881 (1987); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 701, 529 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976); see
also 2 Morris, supra note 28, at 1543-45.
196. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
198. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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the statutory issue or if the arbitrator applied an improper legal standard,
outthe arbitral decision would violate the statutory public policy principles
99
lined in the NLRA and the court should vacate the decision.'
In these cases involving external law the arbitrator comes closer to an
adjudicator who decides public law rights, than to a contract reader who
makes decisions that substitute for industrial strife. If an arbitrator errs by
misinterpreting private contract rights, the company or union can correct
such in subsequent negotiations. 2c0 However, a clearly erroneous misapplication of individual statutory rights would be without redress unless there
was a type of review as espoused under the devolution principle.
III.

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CAUSES OF ACTION

Another subject which labor law attorneys must consider today in regard
to the finality of arbitration awards are lawsuits involving the employment
at will doctrine. 20 ' Courts in at least twenty-nine jurisdictions have recognized
some exception to the American common law principle that an employee is
terminable at will. 20 2 These actions for wrongful discharge are perhaps the

199. See supra text accompanying notes 171-76.
200. As noted by Judge Edwards in American Postal Workers v. United States
Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986), where an arbitrator makes a mistake in
regard to contract interpretation "[t]he parties' remedy in such cases is the same
remedy they possess whenever they are not satisfied with the arbitrator's performance
of his or her job: negotiate a modification of the contract or hire a new arbitrator."
Id. at 7.
201. Under the common law doctrine in the United States, employers, in the
absence of specific contractual provisions to the contrary, were free to terminate
employees for good reason, bad reason or no reason. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Blumrosen, Worker's Rights
Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis - A Judge for Our Season, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 480, 481 (1970); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust

Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 484-91.
202. Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management
Considerations,48 Mo. L. REv. 855, 857-58 n. 14 (1983) (collecting cases from twentysix states). Subsequent additions to the list are Arizona: Leikvold v. Valley View
Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984) (en banc); Hawaii: Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Kentucky: Firestone
Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky.
1983); Brown v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984);
New Mexico: Vigil v. Arzola, 101 N.M. 687, 687 P.2d 1038 (1984); North Dakota:
Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1984); see also
McCone v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 Mass. 231, 471 N.E.2d 47 (1984);
Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985); Galante v. Sandez,
196 N.J. Super. 568, 483 A.2d 829 (1984), appeal dismissed, 103 N.J. 492, 511 A.2d
665 (1986); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984);
Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Employer May DischargeAt- Will Employee
For Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544 (1982).
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fastest growing causes of action in the field of labor relations today. 2 3 In
limiting the employment at will doctrine, courts have utilized essentially three
theories: (1) that the termination violates an express or implied contract term
between the employer and the employee; 2°4 (2) that the discharge violates an
implied obligation of good faith between the employer and employee; 2 5 or
2 °6
(3) that the termination violates public policy.
Lawyers representing employers or unions have given little consideration
to these wrongful discharge actions where there is a collective bargaining
agreement between the parties limiting discharges to just cause and providing
for arbitration of any such dispute. Indeed one of the reasons for the emergence of the wrongful discharge action was the lack of remedies for employees
who were not covered under collective bargaining agreements. 20 7 When an
employee's termination is arbitrated under a just cause provision, the parties
might expect some federal court review under Enterprise Wheel but not much
consideration has been given to possible state court action.
This notion has been seriously shaken by cases such as Garibaldi v.
Lucky Food Stores, Inc.2°8 In that case an arbitrator had upheld an em203. For instance, Professor William Gould noted that it has been estimated
that at least one wrongful discharge action is filed every day in the California state
courts. Gould, Reflections on Wrongful DischargeLitigation and Legislation, in Proc.
of the 37th Ann. Meeting, Nat'l Academy of Arbitrators, ARBrrATioN-1984, at 33.
204. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983);
Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Touissant
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
205. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 672 F.2d 1312 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373
Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316
A.2d 549 (1974).
206. See, e.g., Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981);
Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959). For a description of these three theories of recovery (contract, implied
obligation of good faith, and tort), see Heinsz, supra note 202, at 865-77.
207. Although over 90% of employees who are covered by collective bargaining
agreements are protected by "just cause" discharge clauses, it has been estimated
that between one and two-thirds of the workforce are under the employment at will
doctrine. See 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS (BNA) § 40:1
(1983); Peck, Unjust DischargesFrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 Oio ST. L.J. 1, 8 (1979). As one court has stated in denying a cause of action
for wrongful discharge to a unionized employee: "An employee covered by a collective
bargaining agreement ... precluding discharge except for proper cause and providing
a grievance procedure which includes binding arbitration is adequately protected contractually from retaliatory discharge." Cox v. United Technologies, Essex Group,
Inc., 240 Kan. 95, __, 727 P.2d 456, 459 (1986); see also Vantine v. Elkhart Brass
Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985); Phillips v. Babcock & Wilcox, 349 Pa. Super.
351, 503 A.2d 36 (1986), appeal denied, 513 Pa. 641, 521 A.2d 933 (1987).
208. 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); see
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ployee's discharge under a labor agreement as being for cause. The employee
then filed a wrongful termination suit, alleging that he had been fired because
he had notified the local health department when his employer had instructed
him to deliver spoiled milk and that this violated state public policy. 2°9 The
court found no preemption under the NLRA since the claim was based on
an overriding state interest arising from the enforcement of a public policy
and had little impact on the regulation of the employer-employee contractual
relationship. 210 The court also held that the arbitrator's decision was not a
bar to the wrongful discharge action, since the lawsuit involved the protection
of a statutory right to report to public health officials, which right was
separate and distinct from any protections that the labor contract might
2
afford the employee. 11
Kinyon & Rohlik, "Deflouring" Lucas through Labored Characterizations:Tort Actions of Unionized Employees, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1985); Taldone, Federal
Preemption of Wrongful Discharge Claims of Union Employees, 12 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 33 (1986); Zimmerman & Howard-Martin, The National Labor Relations Act
and Employment-at-Will: The Federal Preemption Doctrine Revisited, 37 LAB. L.J.
223 (1986); Comment, Unsuccessful Employee ArbitrantsBring Wrongful Discharge
Claims in State Court: The Accommodation of Public and PrivateAdjudication, 35
BuPFhAo L. REV. 295 (1986).
209. 726 F.2d at 1368.
210. Id. at 1371-73
211. Id. at 1375-76. The Ninth Circuit has been most active in regard to the
issue of the preemption of unionized employees' state wrongful discharge actions,
particularly in light of Lueck v. Allis-Chalmers. See infra text accompanying notes
219-20. In Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984),
the court determined that a union employee's state court wrongful discharge action
based upon alleged complaints about safety violations under the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Administration Act was preempted under section 301 of the NLRA, since
these complaints concerned only federal law and did not involve a strong state interest.
Similarly, the court found preemption in Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d
1347 (9th Cir. 1985), where employees had alleged an action of intentional infliction
of emotional distress because their employer had issued unjustified warning letters,
conducted excessive supervision, altered work assignments and sought to terminate
the employees. The court found that these claims in essence involved the administration of discipline under the collective bargaining agreement, which procedure should
control. In Evangelista v. Inlandboatmen's Union of Pac., 777 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir.
1985), the court applied the preemption doctrine to an employee's claim based upon
an alleged state public policy to protect citizens from job harassment. Again the court
found that resolution of the claim depended upon the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement, rather than an independent state public policy as was involved
in Garibaldi. In DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., 820 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1987), a
union employee attempted to assert a state wrongful discharge action that he had
been terminated for refusing to drive a trailer with expired registration papers. The
employee was unaware that a grace period existed during which he did not have to
display the trailer's registration sticker. The court found that the action was preempted
by the contractual grievance procedure since the employee was in fact not acting in
defense of a public policy of the state of California, but rather was incorrectly
asserting his own interpretation of the law. In such a case the grievance procedure
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Although this preemption issue is far from decided,2 12 a number of courts
have followed the Garibaldirationale and have concluded that the existence
of a grievance-arbitration provision does not affect the ability of an employee
to bring an action for wrongful discharge. 2 3 For instance, in Midgett v.
should apply. However, in Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.
1987), the court found that employee state law claims of defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on an employer's distribution of a letter accusing
the employee of purchasing cocaine were not preempted by section 301. The court
determined that the collective bargaining agreement was vague in regard to disciplinary
formalities, did not regulate suspension letters, and did not govern allegedly defamatory conduct. Thus, the court determined that examining the labor agreement would
not resolve the employee's claim and that such claim under state law was not preempted.
212. Several courts have applied the preemption doctrine to employee state
wrongful discharge tort claims based upon alleged violations of public policy. Lingle
v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Nos. 85-2971, 86-1763, slip op. at 20 (7th Cir. June
23, 1987) (en banc) (state wrongful discharge action by employees who alleged that
they were discharged for invoking, or threatening to invoke, state workers' compensation laws); DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., 820 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1987) (alleged
violation of public policy for refusing to drive a trailer with expired registration
papers, although employee unaware that a grace period existed during which the
registration sticker need not be displayed); Evangelista v. Inlandboatmen's Union of
Pac., 777 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1985) (public policy asserted of protecting persons from
job harassment); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985)
(state retaliatory discharge action based on Indiana's Workers' Compensation Laws);
Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) (state
wrongful discharge action based upon federal mine safety law); Mann v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 651 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (state law tort claim alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Nelson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.,
648 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mont. 1986) (state tort claim of wrongful termination preempted
by federal law and bad faith discharge on the basis of gender not preempted); Snow
v. Bechtel Constr., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (wrongful discharge
action based upon reporting alleged flagrant safety violations at a nuclear power
plant); Peoples v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 638 F. Supp. 402 (M.D. Pa.
1985) (wrongful termination suit alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress
and tortious interference with contractual relations under state law); Cox v. United
Technologies, Essex Group, 240 Kan. 95, 727 P.2d 456 (1986) (tort action for retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim); Brinkman v. State, 729 P.2d 1301
(Mont. 1986) (state action for termination based upon workers' compensation statute).
213. Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1987) (state law
claims of defamation and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress
due to employer letter accusing employee of purchasing cocaine); Baldracchi v. Pratt
& Whitney Aircraft Div., United Technologies Corp., 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987)
(state wrongful termination action based upon filing workers' compensation claim);
Herring v. Prince Macaroni, Inc., 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986) (state action for
discharge based upon filing workers' compensation claim); Peabody Galion v. Dollar,
666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1986) (state retaliatory discharge action based upon filing
workers' compensation claim); Tuttle v. Bloomfield Hills School Dist., 156 Mich.
App. 527, 402 N.W.2d 54 (1986) (employee state action based upon state "whistleblowers" statute); MGM Grand Hotel-Reno, Inc. v. Insley, 728 P.2d 821 (Nev. 1986)
(state retaliatory discharge suit based upon employee's right to receive industrial
insurance benefits under state statute).
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Sackett-Chicago, Inc.,214 the Illinois Supreme Court allowed an employee to
pursue a claim of wrongful discharge based upon an allegation that he had
been fired for filing a workers' compensation claim. The court found that
the plaintiff was not barred from the action for his failure to pursue a
grievance under the collective bargaining contract. The court held that the
labor agreement could only protect purely private rights, whereas the tort
action would vindicate public policies and allow a remedy of punitive damages.

215

One impact of these decisions is again to lessen the finality of arbitral
awards. More significantly, courts in cases such as Garibaldi and Midgett
have given no deference or consideration to the arbitral process. Rather, the
courts have simply borrowed from the notions of Alexander v. GardnerDenver regarding the distinction between statutory and contractual rights. 216
However, one must look closer at the basis of the wrongful discharge action.
If the lawsuit alleging improper termination is based on the theory of a
violation of an express or implied contractual provision or the implied obligation of good faith dealing, then the collective bargaining procedures should
preempt. Here the heart of the contractual wrongful discharge action is the
regulation of the employer-employee relationship. Such a case is simply duplicative of the rights and remedies provided in the labor contract. 217 The
only significant difference would be that the matter in the wrongful discharge
action would be interpreted in accordance with state law. It is just such a
21 8
situation that the preemption doctrine was meant to avoid.
214. 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 278
(1985).
215. Id. at 149-52, 473 N.E.2d at 1283-85; see also Gonzalez v. Presstress Eng'g
Corp., 115 I11.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 308 (1986); Byrd v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
152 II1.App. 3d 292, 504 N.E.2d 216 (1987).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
217. In such a case the employee is only attempting to substitute the judgment
of a state judge or jury for that of an arbitrator as to whether contract rights covered
by the labor agreement have been violated. This, the courts have not allowed. Lingle
v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Nos. 85-2971, 86-1763, slip op. at 20 (7th Cir. June
23, 1987) (en banc); Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1985);
Evangelista v. Inlandboatmen's Union of Pac., 777 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1985); Olguin
v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984); Bartley v. University Asphalt Co., 111 Ill. 2d 318, 489 N.E.2d 1367 (1986); MGM Grand HotelReno, Inc. v. Insley, 728 P.2d 821 (Nev. 1986). Nor have the courts permitted employees to avoid the preemption doctrine by pleading a cause in tort which in reality
is contractual in nature and duplicative of the collective bargaining agreement. Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986); Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752
F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1985).
218. Since San Diego Bld. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959),
the foundation of the preemption doctrine has been that state jurisdiction must yield
where there is an actual or potential conflict with national labor policy so that there
will be a uniform approach in regard to labor law and the interpretation of collective
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This was the approach of the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers Corp.
v. Lueck. 2 9 There a unionized employee had filed a state law tort action
claiming that an employer had engaged in bad faith delay in processing a
disability claim under the collective bargaining agreement. The court determined that the state suit was preempted by section 301 and the arbitration
process outlined in the collective bargaining agreement. The court concluded
that the test of whether preemption should apply to a state tort action was:
[Whether the [tort claim] confers non-negotiable state law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract, or,
instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with
consideration of the terms of the labor contract.Y20
The court concluded that the state court would be required to interpret the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the employee had a valid tort cause of action for willful breach of contract. Such
an action would in essence bypass the arbitrator and undermine the principle
that it is the arbitrator and not a state court which has the responsibility to
interpret labor contracts.
Although Lueck did not deal directly with a wrongful discharge action,
its principles should apply in such cases, especially those based on theories
of contract breach. For in such instances by definition the "claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract"
which prohibit discharge without just cause.
A wrongful discharge action based upon tort theories involves different
considerations. Here the basis of the action is a violation of public policy
usually expressed in state statutes or judicial opinions.2'1 However, again
such public policy notions are not totally distinct from rights under a collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, the just cause provision in a labor
contract should prohibit the discharge of an employee who files a workers'
compensation claim, gives a report to a state or federal agency adverse to
bargaining agreements. See also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 107
S. Ct. 2161, 2164-66 (1987); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218-19
(1985); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04
(1962); R. GORMAN, supra note 143, at 766-70.
219. 471 U.S. 202 (1984). The Court reiterated its holding in International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161, 2163 (1987), where it found that an
employee's state tort claim that a union had breached its duty to provide a member
with a safe workplace depended substantially upon the interpretation of a collective
bargaining contract and was therefore preempted by section 301. Cf. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 107 S. Ct. 1410 (1987) (grievance procedure under
the Railway Labor Act and parties' collective bargaining agreement does not preempt
a railroad employee's right to sue his employer for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for allegedly condoning harassment by coworkers that led to
an emotional breakdown).
220. 471 U.S. at 213.
221. See supra note 206.
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the employer, or engages in other legally protected activity.22 Thus the issues
involved in wrongful discharge litigation, where an employee is also covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, will normally be interrelated with the
labor contract. Under the principles of Lueck the arbitration process should
223
prevail.
However, even if a court considered a tort wrongful discharge action to
be based upon "non-negotiable state law rights... independent of any right
established by contract," the approach of cases such as Garibaldior Midgett
is still flawed. The primary difficulty is that these courts overlook what the
Supreme Court noted in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver-thatan arbitral decision on a statutory rights issue was entitled to weight by a court if certain
prerequisites were met.24 Certainly the public policy interests are just as
significant in cases involving the rights of individuals under statutes such as
Title VII, the NLRA, or other federal legislation as they are in instances of
rights protected by principles of public policy found in state law. Thus even
where the preemption doctrine does not apply to prohibit a state action by
an employee, despite the applicability of an arbitration procedure, the processes of resolution required in the collective bargaining agreement do not
become irrelevant. Where an employee has pursued a contractual remedy to
arbitration, the state court should consider the arbitrator's award under the
222. American Meat Packing Co., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1327 (1982) (Malinowski, Arb.) (discharge improper where employee filed claim for on-the-job injury
which employer did not prove was fraudulent); Thunderbird Inn, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
849 (1981) (Armstrong, Arb.) (employee improperly discharged for protected union
activity); City of Indianapolis, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1054 (1981) (Hollander, Arb.)
(discharge overturned for employee who filed workers' compensation claim which
employer alleged was invalid); Contractors Steel, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 327 (1981)
(Ellmann, Arb.) (discharge too severe for employee who exercised right to bring
lawsuit against union and employer); Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 73 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 755 (1979) (Chiesa, Arb.) (improper discharge for employee who filed and
recovered unemployment compensation); Messenger Corp., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 865
(1979) (Brooks, Arb.) (discharge of union president for distributing union cards was
improper disparate treatment constituting unfair labor practice); Carborundom Co.,
72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 118 (1979) (Altrock, Arb.) (suspension of union officials for
engaging in protected activity of filing grievances overturned).
223. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Nos. 85-2971, 86-1763,
slip op. at 20 (7th Cir. June 23, 1987) (en banc); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co.,
762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985); Mann v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 651 F. Supp. 580 (E.D.
Ark. 1986); Nelson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 648 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mont.
1986); Cox v. United Technologies, Essex Group, Inc., 240 Kan. 95, 727 P.2d 456
(1986); Brinkman v. State, 729 P.2d 1301 (Mont. 1986).
224. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text; cf. Peabody Galion v.
Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981) (court refused to defer to an arbitration award
against an employee who subsequently filed a wrongful discharge action for alleged
retaliatory termination in violation of state workers' compensation statute, but conceded that some aspects of the dispute, such as the employee's fitness to work, could
be resolved through arbitration).
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devolution principles outlined previously.22 Thus if there is an interrelationship between the public policy rights and the contract issues, if the parties
inform and jointly submit the public policy issue to the arbitrator in determining the contractual dispute, if the forum of arbitration is adequate to
handle the issue, and if the arbitrator considers the issue and applies a proper
legal standard, deference should be given to the arbiter's award in a subsequent wrongful discharge action.
One difficulty with the devolution principle in an employment at will
situation might be the arbitrator's determination of the proper legal standard,
due to the possible uncertainty as to the contours of public policy. However,
most state courts that have accepted the wrongful discharge tort have required
that the public policy be well defined either in statutory proscriptions, constitutional rights or judicial decisions. 226 An arbitrator should have no more
difficulty applying a proper legal standard in a case alleging a violation of
state public policy than in one alleging the violation of the hot cargo provisions outlined in section 8(e) of the NLRA. 227 Moreover it would be for
the reviewing court to determine whether the arbitrator had utilized an impermissible legal standard in reaching his or her decision. 228
Whether there has in fact been a violation of the well defined public
policy in a wrongful discharge tort suit is a question for the trier of fact.
This issue involves notions of credibility, causation, and mitigation which
are the grist of the decision-making mill of an arbitrator.229 That arbitration
would be an adequate forum for such a resolution is underscored by a number
of legislative proposals regarding employment at will cases which advocate
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. For example, the California
State Bar Ad Hoc Committee on Termination at Will and Wrongful Discharge has suggested to the California legislature forms of arbitration as an
20
alternative to such lawsuits.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 134-59.
226. See Heinsz, supra note 202, at 873-75.
227.
228.
229.

See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 168, 171-86.
See, e.g., Creasey Co., 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 998 (1981) (Edelman, Arb.)

(causation); Covington Furniture Mfg. Corp., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 455, 458-59 (1980)
(Holley, Arb.) (credibility); Frito-Lay, Inc., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 293 (1980) (Brown,
Arb.) (credibility and causation); Markle Mfg. Co., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1292, 1299
(Williams, Arb.) (mitigation); National Serv. Indus., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 538 (1979)
(Amis, Arb.) (causation); Ogden Air Logistics Center., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 445, 45758 (1979) (Richardson, Arb.) (causation); Orlando Transit Co., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
897, 900-03 (1978) (Serot, Arb.) (mitigation); see also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
supra note 4, at 650-88.
230. Gould, supra note 203, at 32-51. For a similar approach in regard to
legislation proposed in the state of Michigan requiring arbitration of certain wrongful
discharge claims, see Heinsz, supra note 202, at 863-64. One commentator has

proposed a statute in California to provide for "no-cause" discharge, i.e., allow an
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A key difficulty with the use of the arbitral forum in wrongful discharge
situations is one of remedy. Critics note that in tort actions successful plaintiffs can recover punitive and compensatory damages, whereas the arbitral
process does not allow for such. 23' This is not totally accurate since arbitrators
in certain circumstances have allowed punitive-type sanctions to successful
parties. 2 2 Although it is true punitive or compensatory damages are normally
inappropriate in the arbitral forum, 233 perhaps arbitrators should be allowed
to give more consideration to this remedy in discharge situations involving
public policy violations.
Even if courts held that such a rule allowing punitive relief would be
improper in arbitral proceedings due to their contractual nature, other considerations would still come into play. The lessening of the possibility of
punitive damages might be a tradeoff that employees, who are covered by a
collective bargaining agreement, would be required to make in return for the
relative speed and lower costs of utilizing the arbitral system. Some authorities have noted that the cost alone of wrongful discharge litigation often
makes the alternative of litigation inaccessible to a substantial portion of the
work force.2 14 Another possible solution would be to allow the successful
grievant who has proved a violation of public policy in an arbitration case
to pursue additional remedies in a state proceeding. 235 Although the remedy
employer an option to discharge employees without cause upon payment of a statutorily calculated amount of money. Prince, A Model Proposal: The Statutory "No
Cause" Alternative to Wrongful Discharge in California, 24 SA DiEGo L. Rav. 137
(1987).

231. See, e.g., Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d
1280 (1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 278 (1985).
232. See, e.g., Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598
F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F.
Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Baker v. Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 208 Cal. Rptr.
676 (1984); Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Constr., Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984); see also M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 184-92 (1981).
233. See, e.g., Howard P. Foley Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
Local 639, 789 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assocs., 102 N.M. 607,
698 P.2d 880 (1985); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793,
386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976). But see Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and Arbitration:
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REv. 953 (1986).
234. See Gould, supra note 203, at 34-36.
235. The Supreme Court has allowed analogous proceedings under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1982). If an employee
successfully processes an employment discrimination charge through a state agency
or state court proceedings, the successful plaintiff can bring a Title VII action in
federal court for the purpose of collecting an additional remedy of attorney's fees.
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980); see also Unger v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing possible recovery
for attorney's fees due to local proceedings where the employee did not prevail, but
eventually won the Title VII action in federal court); Moreno v. City & County of
San Francisco, 567 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (attorney's fees allowed in Title
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issue is a thorny problem, it should not result in totally ignoring an arbitrator's award in a subsequent wrongful discharge action.
Where an employee has utilized the arbitration process and the devolution principles are applicable, a court should defer to that system of dispute
resolution. To abandon any consideration of the labor arbitration decision
in this area of increasing litigation would seriously impinge not only upon
the finality of arbitral awards but also on the arbitration system itself.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite its inherent ambiguity, the Enterprise Wheel "essence" formula
has worked well as a standard of judicial review for arbitration cases involving solely private contractual rights. In such situations courts should be
wary of expanding the number of judicial exceptions under a court's notion
of what parties would have expected in the way of industrial justice. If there
is a sufficient link between the award and the contract, the court should
affirm the labor arbitration decision. It is in arbitration cases where questions
involving external law beyond the parties' private agreement have arisen that
the essence standard alone has proved inadequate.
As the area of public rights for individuals continues its expansion, an
even greater impact on collective bargaining agreements and the arbitration
system is inevitable. This tension has put significant strain on the arbitration
process. Like it or not, on many occasions today arbitrators cannot simply
look to the agreement between a company and a union to resolve a contractual dispute. Rather, oftentimes considerations of external law are interwoven into the contractual issue and necessitate a judgment involving public
as well as private interests. When this occurs, the arbitrator becomes more
like an adjudicator rather than a mere contract interpreter. What accommodation courts should make in these instances to the arbitral process has
remained an unsettled issue. While ignoring the arbitral process entirely would
be inappropriate, so would totally acquiescing to the decision of a labor
arbitrator in cases involving public interest. However, parties practicing in
the field of labor law deserve a more certain legal standard as to the amount
of weight and degree of deferral that an arbitration award will receive from
courts when public policy rights collide with the labor arbitration system.
One possible resolution is the principle of devolution outlined in this Article.
VII action in which fees were incurred in successfully prosecuting a claim of employment discrimination before city civil service commission even though the claimant
was not required to pursue the state remedy before filing a federal action); Annotation, Award of Attorney's Fees Under § 706(k) of Civil Rights Act of 1964 Authorizing Court to Allow PrevailingParty, Other Than Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission or United States, Reasonable Attorney's Fees As Partof Costs in Action
Under Equal Employment Opportunities Part of Act, 16 A.L.R. Fed. 643 § 5[3]
(Supp. 1986).
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Although the "golden age" of labor arbitration as a system separate
and unto itself perhaps has passed, the institution of labor arbitration has
by no means withered away. Rather the era has been replaced by what one
might refer to as the "age of sophistication," which will require more demanding analysis and complex decision making by all involved in the system.
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